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This thesis examines the activities and beliefs of a group of scientists, mostly former 
Manhattan Project workers, who were politically active in the years immediately following WWII. 
Their organized activities formed what we call the Atomic Scientists' Movement. Through groups 
including the Federation ofAmerican Scientists, the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, and the 
Association of Los Alamos Scientists, and publications including the Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, these men and women promoted policies of civilian control of atomic research and 
some form of international agreement governing the manufacture and use of atomic devices. 
In spite of frequent requests by their critics to constrain their official opinion to matters of 
established scientific fact, these movement scientists were either unable or unwilling to make such 
a distinction: in the years following the war, these scientists claimed expert authority over all 
things nuclear, whether that be the nuclear laboratory or atomic energy politics. 
This paper argues that this perspective on science and society is very similar to that 
explored from the 1960s forward by individuals doing work in the history & sociology of science, 
or "science studies" and works particularly with the work of Bruno Latour in order to name and 
explain the issues at work in the scientists' movement's redefinition of a scientist's proper place. 
The work of the movement scientists provided an entirely new way of thinking and popularized 
that way of thinking, fifteen to tw'enty years before those same ideas gained currency in the formal 
academic world. For those who recognized it, the atomic bomb provided the catalyst for the 
dissolution of conventional boundaries between science and society: from that point forward, for 
at least some part of the American public, politics clearly and obviously affected the pursuit of 
science, and scientists clearly and obviously had relevant perspectives on social issues. 
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We scientists ask public support of our efforts to bring realization to America that 
mankind's destiny is being decided today, now, this moment. We must let people 
know that a new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move 
toward higher levels. 
-Albert Einstein, 1946 
In some sort of crude sense in which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement 
can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge 
which they cannot lose. 
-J. Robert Oppenheimer, 1947 
I meant that we had known the sin of pride. We had turned to effect in what 
proved to be a [major] way the course ofman's history. We had the pride of 
thinking we knew what was good for man, and I do think it left a mark on many 
of those who were responsibly engaged. This is not the natural business of a 
scientist. 
-J. Robert Oppenheimer, 1965 
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Introduction 
On August 6,1945, at 8:50 am, an atomic bomb called "Little Boy" was 
dropped on Hiroshima, introducing the world to the breathtaking, appalling 
power of the atomic bomb. As the world reeled from this revelation, many of the 
scientists who helped to create it stepped into a role unfamiliar to them: that of 
the political activist. Believing that the atomic bomb forever changed the 
relationship of science to society, these individuals began crafting a warning for 
the American government and the public at large. Concerned with their part in 
creating a more dangerous world, these Manhattan Project scientists assumed the 
burden ofguiding civilization toward safer, more peaceful paths. Their efforts 
formed what we now call the atomic scientists' movement. 
The men and women of the atomic scientists' movement brought to a roar 
sentiments that had been but a whisper in the years before the war: science is 
more than an isolated search for knowledge; science and its products have 
impacts upon society and society's structures impact the pursuit of science; 
scientists have obligations to steward their creations and perhaps to guide their 
work toward crafting a better world. This view differed sharply from common 
conceptions of science as an impersonal, apolitical, and esoteric endeavor. The 
persistent and widespread work of the atomic scientists' movement in the years 
immediately following the war made socially relevant science conceivable and 
even credible to a large portion of the American public. 
While we can find prewar examples of socially involved scientists, the 
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magnitude and public presence of this involvement changed drastically after the 
war: for most scientists, the atomic bomb made plain the extensive networks 
linking science and society. However, the activist scientists were not the only 
players with strong views about the relationship between science and society. 
Scientists who had worked through the war administrating government 
laboratories had strong ties to the system they were working under: a system 
which gave them the privileged status as spokesmen for all ofAmerican science. 
Officials in the government and the military were also strongly invested in the 
framework of isolated and apolitical science, as they found the products ofscience 
(Le., bombs) much more useful than the opinions of scientists. 
BRUNO LATOUR AND THE MODERN CONSTITUTION 
To better define and discuss the competing worldviews addressed in this 
thesis, we will look to Bruno Latour's description of the "modern constitution" as 
outlined in his 1991 work We Have Never Been Modern. The modern 
constitution is a way of categorizing and understanding the world which, Latour 
claims, has dominatedWestern thought since the middle of the seventeenth 
century.l 
Latour uses the word "constitution" to convey a set of rules establishing 
branches of power (such as those of government) and the separations between 
them. By "modern," he means the common historical usage describing a period 
1 For the classic treatment of the origin of the social/scientific divide in the seventeenth century, see 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.) 
3 
beginning in the seventeenth century and extending through sometime in the 
twentieth century. However, Latour points out that we can glean much more 
from the term "modern" than simply a designation for a period of time. To 
declare something modern we also declare what came before to be archaic: we 
evoke ideas of progress and acceleration. The modern constitution is the set of 
rules which make the modern period work, which define its way of thinking and 
of categorizing the world. 
What makes the modern period tick, according to Latour, is a set of 
"guarantees" designating the relationships between nature and society. The first 
guarantee, "even though we construct Nature, Nature is as ifwe did not construct 
it," declares that although we discover the truths of nature in laboratories using 
apparatuses ofour own fabrication, those truths nonetheless exist outside ofus 
and are transcendent. The second guarantee, "even though we do not construct 
Society, Society is as ifwe did construct it," declares that society exists solely 
because human will designed it, ignoring that society consists of the interaction of 
human beings with each other and the natural world whether or not that 
interaction was consciously designed. 2 
The third guarantee, most vital to the work at hand, declares that "Nature 
and Society must remain absolutely distinct."3 This promise of the modern 
constitution is the glue which holds the other two together. Ifone tries to 
consider Nature and Man transcendent at the same time a clear contradiction 
2 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991) 32. 
3 ibid. 
1 
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anses. By keeping these two spheres permanently divided, the modern way of 
thinking takes shape: Latour calls this process of constant separation the 
"modern critical stance." The moment that we allow these two spheres to cross 
into one another, breaking the third guarantee and thus defying the first two as 
well, we cease to be modern.4 
This is not to say that objects which cross this boundary do not exist; to the 
contrary, the modern way of life constantly multiplies such objects. These 
objects, mixtures of nature and culture, Latour dubs "hybrids," while the 
practices that create them are "networks." We can see hybrids everywhere in our 
society, among them is the phenomenon of global warming, which combines 
human actions with environmental responses, which are then measured by 
scientists and responded to by politicians. Other hybrids are stem cell research, 
psychotropic drugs, abortion, and certainly the atomic bomb: a combination of 
scientific harnessing of natural forces with the desire of nations to demolish one 
another. However, as soon as these hybrids are created, the modern critical 
stance intervenes. Political aspects of a particular problem are relegated to the 
political sphere and dealt with by political experts; natural aspects are studied by 
scientists, who proclaim truths about the natural world. This process of 
purification is absolutely central to perpetuation of the modern constitution. 
It is important that we distinguish between the concept of hybrids as 
described by Latour and the notion put forward by the Edinburgh School of 
science studies that the social aspects of science go "all the way down," that is, 
4 ibid. 
5 
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science is nothing but a social creation. In discussing hybrids, we illustrate that 
the categories of "nature" and "culture" are inherently artificial, created by man 
and upheld by the tenets of the modern constitution. This is not to say that there 
is no truth in science: clearly, the work of scientists is effective in understanding, 
manipulating, and controlling the natural world. Rather, the work at hand 
explores the idea that there is no way to draw a line between the scientific and the 
political. 
While Latour is certain that the modern constitution is unraveling, he 
seems unsure of exactly when this dissolution began. He estimates that it has 
been underway "for twenty years or so" and later cites Serge Moscovici's 1977 
Essai sur l'histoire humaine de la nature as a milestone in the amodern 
perspective.s To this we can certainly add Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962, as a definitive moment in thinking 
about science and society in tandem. However, the work of activist scientists in 
the years following the second world war already displayed a perspective divorced 
from the restrictions of the modern constitution. 
The members of the atomic scientists' movement from 1945 to 1950 
explored new ground by claiming authority in the political sphere on the basis of 
their scientific knowledge. Their work was based on the premise that the atomic 
bomb created a permanent change in the relationship between science and 
society. This is a more conservative statement than Latour's claim that the 
5 Latour 3,15. Following Latour, I use the tenn "amodem" to describe that way of thinking that follows 
the dissolution of the modem constitution, and not "postmodem," a philosophical movement which 
Latour considers only a symptom ofthis deterioration. He describes postmodemism as "intellectual 
immobility," "the abdication ofthought," and a victim of"self-inflicted defeat" (61). 
--~--==--
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networks between science and society have always existed. Nonetheless, by 
highlighting these networks the atomic scientists' movement chipped the first 
hairline fractures across the face of the modern constitution. Though patched for 
a time by the efforts of McCarthyism, it would irrevocably shatter in the 1960s 
and beyond. 
THE PATII AHEAD 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first two follow actions that 
took place roughly concurrently, while the third falls chronologically later. All 
three chapters focus on the atomic scientists' movement: origins, goals, methods, 
impacts, and eventual demise. 
The first chapter introduces the movement, primarily composed ofyoung 
men working in the laboratories of the Manhattan Project. While they tried to 
exert some political influence during the war, it wasn't until the war's end that the 
atomic scientists' movement was able to speak publicly about the bomb and its 
implications. The efforts of the movement split in two complimentary directions 
from the outset, one devoted to public education and the other to achieving 
specific policy objectives. Its policy-oriented work first addressed the defeat of 
the May-Johnson bill, second, the passage of the McMahon act, and third, the 
establishment of an international system for managing atomic energy. The May­
Johnson bill was introduced in October 1945 and served as a cau,-to-arms for the 
atomic scientists, who viewed it as establishing total military control of nuclear 
science. This bill was essentially defeated by December 1945, and in January 
----01.......
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1946 Senator Brian McMahon, a movement ally and chair of the Senate Special 
Committee on Atomic Energy, introduced a bill which encompassed the atomic 
scientists' movement vision for appropriate domestic control of nuclear science. 
However, the path toward passing this bill was rocky. Scientific communications 
between colleagues began to look increasingly like security risks as tensions 
mounted between Russia and the U.S. The bill was modified to reflect these 
growing fears and scientists who disagreed with the changes were painted as 
potential spies. Such accusations of un-American activities would serve as 
increasingly useful tools for the movement's opponents, as we will see in chapter 
3. However, in August the bill passed both houses and was signed into law: a 
second political victory for the scientists. 
Chapter 1 concludes by discussing the drive for international control: the 
goal the scientists most wanted to achieve but least understood how to pursue. 
Their work focused on serving in advisory roles for policy thinktanks and on 
lobbying the public for support. A plan to their liking was sent to the U.N., but 
domestic public support was ineffectual in changing the views of international 
leaders. Negotiations at the D.N.lagged and after a few years were declared 
deadlocked: international control was not to be. 
Chapter 2 looks again to the movement's first few years to examine more 
closely what the scientists were saying to the public, as opposed to their political 
pursuits in Washington. This analysis in an in-depth look at how they justified 
different sorts of appeals, from the book One World or None, their greatest 
educational effort, to frequent requests for funds by means of telegram or letter. 
__________1I _
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Throughout this chapter we see the theme ofa post-atomic world which requires 
a new and different understanding of scientists and society, as well as the call for 
the common citizen to learn as much possible about nuclear science. In their 
petitions to the public even more than their work with politicians, movement 
scientists seem to ignore the modern constitution. They unblinkingly highlighted 
the networks that had long been hidden. 
The third chapter examines the end of the movement. While the troubling 
lack of progress in the U.N. sapped enthusiasm from the campaign, the more 
drastic blows came from red-baiting both within and without. In the summer of 
1946 Daniel Melcher, the head of atomic scientists' organization the National 
Committee for Atomic Education, was fired by the executive committee of that 
organization. Although the committee claimed otherwise, FBI documents make 
it clear that Melcher was fired in an attempt to purge from within any potential 
communist influence. Beginning in 1947, scientists who had been involved in the 
movement or other political causes on the left began to encounter increasing 
difficulties in obtaining security clearances necessary for their work. Of these, the 
best publicized was the case of Edward Condon, chair of the National Bureau of 
Standards. Accused of associating with spies, Condon faced hearings before the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities and struggled for years under the 
burden of Its suspicions: although he was never found guilty, distrust followed 
him for the rest of his career. 
In the face of so much outside anti-communist sentiment, the movement 
began policing its speech from within. Memos declaring that statements should 
~, 
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be categorized, with political opinions carefully and explicitly distinguished from 
scientific facts, show that the modern constitution had been reasserted not only 
in the minds of the American public but inside the movement as well. By 1950, 
financial and political troubles essentially shut down the movement. 
In these last years of the movement we see the justification used to re­
assert the modern constitution: the idea that politically involved scientists were 
not only unqualified politicians, they were a threat to national security and 
therefore must be silenced. This steady purging of scientists who defied the 
modern constitution disrupted thousands of careers throughout the 1950S. 
However, by 1962 the ideas first seen in the atomic scientists' movement were 
blooming elsewhere. While the atomic bomb was the first hybrid object with 
undeniably obvious networks between nature and culture, the years that followed 
brought countless more; as Latour says of the late twentieth century, "it is as if 
there were no longer enough judges and critics to partition the hybrids."6 
The atomic scientists' movement made many of the same claims as the 
later historians and sociologists of science. They also offered a much different 
model for the political involvement of scientists than that in the United States 
today. Rather than requiring a few appointed scientists to represent all science 
before the halls of government, the scientists' movement suggests that a vital, 
politically involved scientific community can provide valuable and broad-based 
insight into the governance of hybrids. 
6 Latour, 50. 
I -----------------------------------------------. 
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Chapter 1
 
The Atomic Scientists' Movement: Policy Objectives
 
What was the atomic scientists' movement? For more than a year 
following the end of WWII it was an almost constant presence in U.S. magazines 
and newspaper editorial pages. Its speakers frequented citizen's groups and 
lecture halls across the country and saturated the airwaves with broadcasts and 
interviews. In our era of soundbytes and here-today, gone-tomorrow news, it is 
difficult to envision the persistence with which movement scientists kept their 
cause in the public eye. And what was this cause? While it took on different 
particulars depending on political events of the day, it had to do with an 
overwhelming sense of something wrong in the state of science, and more broadly 
in the relationship of science to the state. The scientists who made up the atomic 
scientists' movement wanted to bring their knowledge of nuclear energy and the 
threat of nuclear weapons to the public as well as to government officials, 
conveying not only information about atomic bombs but also political and social 
ideas about the way science should be managed. They did not feel that engaging 
in such political activities was inappropriate; to the contrary, they felt that their 
knowledge and their work obligated them to do so. 
The atomic scientists' movement grew out of feelings of discontent and 
worry in the Manhattan Project laboratories during wartime, growing into the 
formation of formal organizations after the use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in August of 1945. These organizations included the Atomic 
1.
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Scientists of Chicago, the Association of Oak Ridge Scientists, and the Association 
of Los Alamos Scientists. While it is difficult to estimate the membership of these 
associations, one petition from the Clinton Labs at Oak Ridge was reported to 
bear more than one hundred signatures. These groups were founded without 
great fanfare, and indeed for two months following the bombings were publicly 
quiet. According to physicist Leo Szilard, they were "requested by the War 
Department to exercise the greatest possible reserve."7 This order came from 
General Leslie Groves, military commander of the Manhattan Project, and was 
probably passed along through laboratory leaders such as J. Robert Oppenheimer 
and Arthur Compton, who were serving in high-status government advisory roles 
at the time.8 
This restraint was broken on October 3 of that year, when the War 
Department released the May-Johnson Bill for military control of atomic energy. 
The groups that made up the atomic scientists' movement suddenly had a 
political cause, as the May-Johnson Bill's emphasis on military uses of atomic 
energy and rigid peacetime secrecy threatened to institutionalize many of the 
movement scientists' fears: perpetuation of the war-time security measures on 
atomic science and the development of atomic energy for predominantly military 
objectives. By October 31, concerned men and women from every major 
Manhattan Project laboratory had gathered in Washington DC to found a 
national organization: The Federation of Atomic Scientists. 
The atomic scientists' movement had at its head several prominent
 
Leo Szilard, "We Turned the Switch," The Nation, CLXI (December 22, 1945), 718-19.
 
Barton J. Bernstein, "Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years," HSPS (18:2),247.
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scientists, including Nobel laureate Harold C. Urey, a chemist who worked during 
the war at the Manhattan Project's Substitute Alloy Materials Laboratory at 
Columbia University and Edward U. Condon, founder of MIT's Radiation 
Laboratory and briefly the assistant director of Las Alamos in 1943.9 Albert 
Einstein also served from 1946 as chair of the Emergency Committee ofAtomic 
Scientists, a fundraising organization created in support of the movement. 
However, the movement drew its identity from its membership: predominantly 
young, working scientists of the rank-and-file. In fact, the individuals not present 
in the movement speak more to its character than those who were a part of it: 
laboratory leaders and scientists who already had the government's ear through 
advisory positions, notably Ernest Lawrence, J. Robert Oppenheimer, James 
Conant, Arthur Compton, and Enrico Fermi, were not involved. 
At theWashington office of the Federation ofAtomic Scientists, of the 
twenty-three delegates present in November 1945, six were thirty-five or older, 
while most were between twenty-nine and thirty-tw% The overwhelming youth 
of the atomic scientists' movement membership is not particularly surprising, 
however. The Manhattan Project employed primarily young men, and while the 
project's leadership was older, this leadership was more engaged with 
government work. Laboratory scientists and support workers were encouraged to 
Jessica Wang, "Scientists and the Problem of the Public in Cold War America, 1945-1960," Osiris (17, 
2002),329. 
10 Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and A Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-1947 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), 248. This text is the standard source on the atomic scientists' 
movement. It is an excruciatingly detailed text, which relies on movement correspondence and other 
archival materials, often giving a day-by-day account ofmovement activities. While I often object to 
Smith's uncritical stance toward all players in the movement, her rich detail makes the work invaluable 
given my inability to access many ofher sources. 
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engage with the problems of the laboratory, and to leave thinking about political 
issues to their superiors who were already closely tied to government decision-
making. Disappointment over the failure of early efforts to prevent the bomb's 
use, as well as frustration with these high-status individuals' public silence, drove 
the rank-and-file to step into the political realm themselves. 
EARLY DISSENT: SCIENTISTS SPEAK Up BEFORE TIlE BOMBINGS 
For some Manhattan Project scientists, the impulse toward activism began 
before the bomb was used. In 1944, the physicist Niels Bohr met with Winston 
Churchill and President Roosevelt to try to persuade them that warning the 
Russians about American development of the atomic weapon would help to 
discourage a post-war arms racell Bohr's memorandum focused on the• 
"perpetual menace to human security" that would be posed by such a race. He 
summarized: 
The prevention of a competition prepared in secrecy 
will therefore demand such concessions regarding 
exchange of information and openness about 
industrial efforts, including military preparations, as 
would hardly be conceivable unless all partners were 
assured of a compensating guarantee of common 
security against dangers of unprecedented acuteness.12 
Bohr's meetings with both leaders went badly, and in spite of a number of 
subsequent memos, nothing came ofhis efforts. On September 18,1944, 
Churchill and Roosevelt signed an aide-memoire stating that, when ready, the 
II Smith, 9. 
12 Quoted in Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962),43. 
, 
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bomb could be used against the Japanese. They also discussed Bohr's proposal, 
which they dismissed outright "on the grounds that the time had not yet come to 
tell the world about the bomb."13 
In June of 1945, the scientists at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical 
Lab issued a report concerning the moral implications of using the bomb without 
warning, as well as about the course ofpolicy regarding nuclear energy after the 
war. Drafted by the physicist James Franck and called the Franck Report, it 
stressed the need for international control of atomic energy following the war in 
order to prevent a nuclear arms race.1.4 This report was more policy-based than 
Bohr's memorandum: the authors claimed authority based on their 
"acquaintance with the scientific elements of the situation and prolonged 
preoccupation with its world-wide political implications..."1.5 The Franck report 
stated that averting an arms race should be the primary goal of US nuclear policy, 
and that to this end nuclear weapons should not be used in warfare and should 
only be publicly demonstrated if the prospects for international control looked 
favorable, as the only real "secret" of the bomb was that it worked. Apublic test 
without provisions for international controls would be "a flying start towards an 
unlimited [nuclear] armaments race."16 Therefore, the report recommended that 
the government consider the option of not demonstrating or using the weapon, so 
that other governments would "come into the race only reluctantly, on the basis 
13 Smith, 11. 
14 Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History ofa Scientific Community in Modern America 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), 335. 
15 Quoted in Gilpin, 45. 
16 Ibid,46. 
.......
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of guesswork and without definite knowledge that 'the thing does work. .. '" Like 
Bohr's memo, Franck's report had little effect. Due to obvious security concerns, 
the pleas of the scientists did not become public until after the bomb's use made 
the existence of nuclear energy widely known. 
This is not to say that government decision makers had no scientific input 
while making decisions regarding the bomb. Lawrence, Oppenheimer, Fermi, 
and Compton constituted the special Scientific Advisory Panel to the Interim 
Committee on the atomic bomb, chaired by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and 
including scientific administrators Vannevar Bush, Karl Compton, and James 
Conant. l7 However, knowing the close ties between the scientist administrators 
and their government colleagues the concerned scientists at Chicago and 
elsewhere feared that none of these would be voices of dissent. They therefore 
felt a moral obligation to bring their concerns forward. Furthermore, there was a 
general feeling that misconceptions regarding atomic energy, particularly with 
regard to the idea of a "secret" of the bomb, were already beginning to taint 
policy-making. As the input of the high-level scientists did not seem sufficient to 
allay these destructive ideas, concerned scientists from the rank-and-file tried to 
find ways to educate those with power. In fact, we will later find a consistent 
tendency among these government-affiliated scientists to be more trusting ofthe 
military and more willing to rely on the government's good intentions than their 
counterparts in the rank-and-file, even where explicit policies were lacking. 
Immediately following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the social 
17 Gilpin, 47. 
16 
implications of their work became of paramount importance to many Manhattan 
Project workers. While scientists at Clinton Laboratories had been worrying over 
the problems of the post-atomic age for three years, it was this post-war moment 
that led to the foundation of scientists' organizations at most major laboratories. 
It would be simplistic to claim that the carnage following the atomic bomb was 
necessary to bring a conscience to science as a whole, and the organization of 
several socially concerned scientist groups formed in the 1930S, such as the 
American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom and the American 
Association of Scientific Workers, show that some portion of the American 
scientific community had long been concerned with the social aspects ofscience.18 
However, the bomb provided a focal point that allowed the concerns of a 
few, held in private, to become the concerns of the many, publicly announced. 
The ideological basis of the nascent groups was vague, but revolved around 
concrete points of consensus. First, as scientific discoveries could be 
independently reproduced in other nations, it was inevitable that other nations 
would soon have the bomb: there was no "nuclear secret" to be preserved. 
Second, that international control of atomic energy, and perhaps even a world 
government, was the only way to prevent a massive and broad-sweeping nuclear 
arms race. The scientists also shared concerns over whether the massive secrecy 
provisions they had worked under during the war would continue during 
peacetime, and how nuclear projects would be administered domestically. 
IS	 For an extensive treatment of pre-war scientific activism, see Peter J. Kuznick, Beyond the Laboratory: 
Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
----------	 ..... 
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THE MAy-JOHNSON BILL: A POLITICAL RITE OF PASSAGE 
The May-Johnson Bill was a piece oflegislation aimed at establishing a 
system of domestic control of nuclear projects, hastily written by the War 
Department in the weeks following the war's end. Introduced on October 3, 1945 
by Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado and Representative Andrew J. May of 
Kentucky, the bill almost immediately received the official endorsement of three 
of the four members of the ScientificAdvisory Council: Oppenheimer, Fermi, and 
Lawrence. The scientists in the newly formed movement groups, however, were 
more suspicious. In the vague and broadly framed legislation, they saw the 
potential for all branches of atomic science to be ruled by a military council. They 
saw threats to the free exchange of scientific research, and exceedingly harsh 
repercussions for violations of secrecy provisions. More than anything else, they 
saw a militant tone that seemed to assume an arms race already in progress- a 
detriment to their goals for international negotiations and eventual world control 
of atomic energy.19 
In retrospect, it is important to note that this bill was not an overt power-
grab for military control. Rather, it established two full-time positions, an 
administrator and deputy-administrator, at the head of a part-time commission. 
These individuals would be appointed by the President with the Senate's consent, 
but could be removed at any time by the President for causes in the "national 
interest." Although the bill neither required nor banned military personal in 
these positions, some scientists interpreted it as having clear intentions. Los 
19 The third and fourth chapters of Smith's book deals with the May-Johnson struggle in great detail, and 
are my source for this section unless otherwise noted. 
---lo... 
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Alamos physicist Herbert Anderson explained in a letter to Association of Los 
Alamos Scientists chairman William Higginbotham: "...at the Met Lab the 
wording of the bill was being interpreted to mean that the administrator would be 
an army man, his deputy a navy man, and that the other members, since they 
would be part time with their chief obligations elsewhere, would probably leave 
much of the responsibility in the hands of the administrators."20 
It was not only the structure of the new committee that upset movement 
scientists, but also the broad authority that would be given to it. The bill did not 
require government ownership of nuclear materials or plants, but it gave the 
commission custody of all ores, plants stocks, processes, technical information 
(and its sources!), contracts, leases, patents and patent applications, and "any 
other rights of any kind judged to be relevant."21 The bill also gave the 
commission plenary power over research whenever fission or transmutation of 
atomic species was involved on any scale, but was instructed to encourage 
research in universities and hospitals. 
Security provisions under the May-Johnson bill were severe. The 
commission had authority to ban at the source any information it wished to be 
secret. Violation of any security regulations could result in a fine of $100,000 
and ten years in jail, while intentional transmission of information with intent to 
endanger U.S. interests carried a maximum penalty of $300,000 and thirty years 
in jail. 
However, it was not these powers that raised the most alarm among the 
20	 Ibid, 140. 
Ibid, 130. 
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movement scientists. Rather, the bill's omissions were ofgreatest concern. Since 
the war, the scientists had been focusing their discussions on international 
control and the avoidance of an arms race. Now that they were coming into the 
public arena, however, they faced a bill that not only failed to take into account 
the possibility of future international control agreements, but took an overtly 
hostile and militaristic tone. Physicist Howard J. Curtis of the Association of Oak 
Ridge Scientists explained: "The whole tone of the bill is such that if I were a 
scientist in some other county assuredly [1] would say to myself: 'Those fellows 
over in the States are getting ready to bomb us in a big way.' Any foreign country 
is going to read into it that we are an essentially aggressor nation."22 
Furthermore, the scientists were dismayed that the bill dealt exclusively 
with military uses of atomic energy and failed to consider its possible peaceful 
applications. As Leo Szilard put it, one cannot have a reasonable discussion of 
machinery if some people think its function is the building of power plants and 
others think it is "to provide us with atomic bombs so that we can blast the hell 
out of Russia before Russia blasts the hell out ofUS."23 
For scientists in the movement, the prospect of military control had 
implications beyond the practical. It is true that concerns over secrecy and the 
future direction of research weighed heavy on the scientists' minds. However, 
there were clear ideological issues at stake as well. Movement scientists were 
concerned that secrecy in research would not only impair scientific progress, but 
also permanently mar the democratic system. In their view, atomic energy was 
22 Ibid, 168. 
23 Ibid, 160. 
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unlike most conventional weapons research in that it had unavoidable social and 
political implications. By relegating it entirely to the military sphere of influence 
and guarding it from the public eye, the electorate would become unable to make 
informed decisions while the government would have increasing justification for 
making crucial decisions in secret. These themes resonate throughout the debate 
on the May-Johnson bill: atomic bombs brought the ties between science and 
society, once obscure and easy to ignore, strongly to the fore in the minds of 
American scientists, and much of the American public. 
The bill reached the movement scientists around October 9, when Leo 
Szilard brought copies back to Chicago's Met Lab. That evening, the Atomic 
Scientists of Chicago held a meeting to discuss the bill, and within the next 
several days it became a matter of concern for all of the existing scientist groups. 
Avisitor at the Met Lab that evening, Herbert Anderson of Los Alamos expressed 
a common sentiment in his letter to Higginbotham: "I must confess, my 
confidence in our leaders Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Compton, and Fermi, all 
members of the Scientific Panel advising the Interim Committee and who 
enjoined us to have faith in them and not influence this legislation, is shaken. I 
believe that these worthy men were duped- that they never had a chance to see 
this bill."24 
In fact, Anderson's rather charitable interpretation was not far off. 
Although the Scientific Panel officially endorsed the bill, member endorsement 
flagged as the debate went on. A popular rumor at the time was that General 
24 Ibid, 140. 
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Groves had given the panel an oral briefing on the bill, omitting the possibility of 
military control. While this rumor has not been substantiated, it does not seem 
contradicted by the behavior of the panel members in the following weeks. On 
October 11 and in response to the dissent from Chicago, Oppenheimer, Fermi, 
and Lawrence signed a telegram intended for public release. This telegram 
expressed the opinion that some sort of domestic control was needed 
immediately so as not to delay work in the field, and furthermore that "the 
legislation as presented represents the fruits ofwell-informed and experienced 
consideration."25 Intended to quell debate until the advisory panel could meet the 
following week, this telegram was seen as an affront by many of the movement 
scientists, who were in the process of developing responses. 
The telegram from the Interim Committee scientists highlighted the 
ongoing tension between high-level scientists who had been advising the 
government throughout the war and rank-and-file scientists, who composed most 
of the movement. Some were frustrated with the way wartime science had been 
managed and others were frustrated with their lack of representation regarding 
the decision to use the bomb, and all movement scientists were losing patience 
with the wide-spread willingness of their superiors to trust the good will of 
leaders in the military and the government. This trust, born out of a long 
working relationship on the part of high-level scientists, was foreign to their 
subordinates, to whom military influences appeared universally oppressive. 
All of the individuals in the atomic scientists movement were deeply 
25 Ibid, 143. 
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concerned about the content of the bill, but the reactions of individual groups 
depended largely on those group's experiences during the war and their 
relationships with the wartime laboratory leaders. For the organizations at 
Clinton Labs and in Chicago, the war experience had been one of tightly 
regimented security controls and compartmentalization of knowledge. These 
scientists emerged highly suspicious of military leadership and resentful of 
overreaching security procedures, convinced that military control of atomic 
energy would have unmitigated negative effects. 
The situation at Los Alamos had been different, however. At the insistence 
oflaboratory leader J. Robert Oppenheimer, all scientists at Los Alamos with 
clearance for scientific work were permitted to discuss their findings with one 
another. While information was still closely guarded from the outside world, 
within the bounds of the laboratory the Los Alamos scientists found a rich, 
collaborative environment. For this reason, the Los Alamos scientists were much 
more willing to listen to Oppenheimer when he assured them that, while the May­
Johnson Bill wasn't perfect, he and the other Interim Committee scientists were 
working to improve it, and that public opposition from Los Alamos scientists 
would be counterproductive.26 In short, those individuals who had worked under 
a strict regime of secret science were most opposed to its perpetuation under the 
May-Johnson bill. 
By October 15, a Monday, several movement scientists were working out of 
an informal "headquarters" at the Wardman Park Hotel in Washington D.C. In 
26 Ibid, 172. 
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the following week, Oppenheimer began wavering in his public support of the 
bill, stating before a congressional committee, "The Johnson bill, I don't know 
much about, but what I do know about it is that you could do almost anything 
under that bill, and a wise commission could operate with almost complete 
freedom under that bill. Whether it will or not, I don't know."27 In the same 
spirit, Oppenheimer continued to defend the bill and its authors while denying 
any direct role in its creation. This position alarmed many movement scientists, 
who had assumed that Oppenheimer and the rest of the advisory panel had been 
their representatives in the bill's crafting. 
Congressional hearings on the May-Johnson bill, closed May 9 after a 
single day's testimony from Secretary of War Patterson, General Groves, 
Vannevar Bush, and James Conant, were opened for another day due largely to 
protest from the scientists' groups. The renewed hearings were dominated by 
scientists affiliated with the groups, including Szilard, Anderson, and advisory 
panel member Compton, who made clear why he had not joined his colleagues in 
signing the telegram endorsing the bill. He bristled at the security provisions, 
lamenting that so little was written about the positive implications of atomic 
energy. Oppenheimer also testified that day, supporting the passage of the bill 
with an amendment assuring that scientific work would not be held up by the 
new committee, but again emphasizing the need for immediate passage to allow 
nuclear physicists to get back to work and to establish a groundwork from which 
international negotiations could progress. 
27 Ibid. 
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A word must be said at this point about Oppenheimer, as he is a prominent 
and complex figure in this story. As director of Los Alamos and scientific adviser 
to the executive branch, Oppenheimer had a significant official voice in atomic 
energy policy from his appointment in 1943 to the scandal that ended his 
government work ten years later. He was often in agreement with the issues 
pushed forward by the atomic scientists' groups, was called to testify alongside 
movement scientists in these initial hearings, and later made a small contribution 
to the movement's book, One World or None. However, while Alice Kimball 
Smith regards him charitably as "a very helpful elder statesman" to the 
movement scientists, his actions and statements make it clear that even when he 
agreed with the movement's goals he disagreed strongly with its methods.28 In 
addition to orchestrating the previously cited advisory panel telegram to quell 
dissent, he chastised the movement scientists for their distrust of the military in a 
congressional appearance, and continued to call and telegram Los Alamos 
attempting to quiet the angry scientists.29 His concern for science and for peace 
made him an occasional ally, but his view of the role of scientists in society set 
him dramatically apart from the atomic scientists' movement itself. While he 
often appeared to be working for similar goals, it is not possible for us to consider 
him as much of a partner as Smith portrays him. 
Arthur Compton had similar feelings with regard to the role of science in 
political affairs. Clearly of the opinion that scientists should speak rarely in the 
political sphere, he also recommended that if activist scientists did feel the need 
28 Ibid, 155. 
29 Ibid. 
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to speak publicly on administrative or political aspects of the bill, statements 
should "be presented with the clear indication that they are the expressions of the 
group in their capacity as citizens" as opposed to as scientists.30 Privately, 
Compton wrote of the activism to his brother in early October: "Some of our 
scientific boys helped to muddy the waters by insisting on airing their views with 
Congressmen."31 While these complaints criticize different facets of the scientists' 
activity, his point in both cases is that the rank-and-file scientists have stepped 
beyond their authority as scientists. Like Oppenheimer, Compton resented these 
scientists' demands to be involved in matters of policy, although he and the other 
advisory panel scientists did not seem to see any contradiction in their own 
invited contributions. 
Regarding this distinction, Smith notes that while Compton's insistence on 
a line "between those issues that scientists might legitimately try to influence at 
the early policy-making state and those upon which they should express 
themselves only in public debate" was problematic, the absence of such a line was 
equally so. Without a clear distinction between those matters gerund exclusively 
to "science" or "politics," there was no way for the public "to maintain its respect 
for science if 'scientific facts' produced quite contrary conclusions."32 This 
moment in Smith is exceptional because it is one of the few points where she 
inserts analysis, particularly analysis critical of movement goals, into her 
predominantly narrative work. The struggle between "respect for science" and 
30 Bernstein, 250. 
3\ Ibid, 248. 
32 Smith, 181. 
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the ability for scientists to act with a social conscience is a vitally important one. 
However, she, like Compton, uses a model of the relationship between science 
and society that prevents understanding of what is at stake in this struggle. 
Bruno Latour sees the realms we call science and politics as human-
constructed categories, held as distinct by the "modern constitution."33 Using 
Latour's model, we can see this moment of struggle between Compton and the 
movement scientists as a rupture in the fabric of this modern constitution. 
Compton, defending the modern constitution, insists that there must be a line 
between science and politics. Smith, also modern in her thinking, worries that 
there must be a line, but can't see where to put it. The movement scientists, on 
the other hand, defy the possibility of a line. For a moment rejecting the modern 
mindset, they explain that, "having helped man to make this first step into this 
newworld, they have the responsibility ofwarning and advising him": the issue is 
not politics versus science, but rather responsibility and knowledge.34 Moments 
like this one, common throughout this immediate post-war period, show the 
modern constitution under interrogation. While the bill's sponsors, May and 
Johnson, along with Compton, Oppenheimer, and many others, believed that 
scientists should attend to science while politicians attend to politics (with the 
exception of the rare, and officially appointed, science adviser), the atomic 
scientists' movement saw this strict division as outdated. They wished to replace 
it with a changed world-view, one in which scientists and politicians alike shared 
33 See Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Cathererine Porter, (Cambridge, Harvard 
university's Press, 1991), in particular sections 2.2-2.8 on the creation of the modem constitution. 
34 Hill, Rabinowitch, and Simpson, "The Atomic Scientists Speak Up," Life, XIX (October 29, 1945),45. 
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responsibility for managing the boundary-crossing hybrid products of the new 
age. 
With some urging from atomic scientists' movement groups, letters in 
opposition to the May-Johnson bill poured in to Congress from all over the 
country. On October 23, sixty individuals identifying themselves as scientists, 
educators, and other civic leaders sent a telegram protesting the broad powers of 
the administrator granted under the May-Johnson bill. On November 5, fifty San 
Diego scientists wrote their congressmen opposing the bill on the grounds that its 
security provisions threatened "independence of American thought and 
aspiration."35 Meanwhile, supporters of the bill wrote an open letter to the 
President and Congress. Reflecting the ideological differences between the 
modern view that science has its place and the movement view that science and 
scientists can and sometimes must speak politically, the two hundred signatories 
of this bill identified themselves as "private citizens" from the California Institute 
ofTechnology, Mount Wilson, the Huntington Library, and the University of 
California at Los Angeles. While Compton's protests regarding the self-
identification of scientists when speaking "as citizens" did not seem to much 
affect the movement scientists' writings at this time, it appears that he did impact 
the thinking of at least two hundred scientists in the Los Angeles area. 
Oppenheimer was among the those who signed this letter.36 
Pressure on legislators continued through November, with movement 
scientists and their supporters paying calls on representatives, sending letters 
35 Quoted in Smith, 183. 
36 ibid. 
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and telegrams, making phone calls and publishing newspaper articles. During 
the week of October 22 the House Military Affairs Committee introduced a 
number of changes restricting the scope of the new committee and toning down 
the security provisions. In spite of these changes, scientific opposition along with 
a growing popular concern continued. In early November the Truman 
administration began withdrawing support for the bill, and by December it was so 
strongly opposed in the Senate that it was not even put up for discussion. In the 
months that followed, the May-Johnson bill served the purpose of a yardstick 
against which other domestic control plans could be measured. However, by the 
end of 1945 it seemed clear that the movement scientists had won their first 
battle: they had defeated the May-Johnson bill. 
THE NEXT STEP: THE McMAHON Acr 
Although much of their membership remained primarily concerned with 
issues of international control, the next political challenge that faced the 
movement groups was another domestic control bill. Drafted by a young 
assistant to the counsel for the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy 
(SCAE), under the leadership ofSenator Brian McMahon (D.-Conn.), this bill 
showed clearly the hand of the Atomic Scientists ofChicago and other movement 
groups. The SCAE had begun open hearings on November 27, and its primary 
witnesses were scientists. 
The atomic scientists' movement groups took an optimistic view of the 
educability of the senators, shedding light once more on their thoroughly 
~ 
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networked view of politics and science. From the movement scientists' view, a 
program of "physics for senators" teaching the rudiments of atomic science would 
be sufficient to create statesmen competent to craft nuclear policy. Many in 
government were not so charitable toward the scientists, however-- even after 
months in Washington, they were often told that they were not competent to talk 
about policy issues because they were scientists, not senators. 
The McMahon bill satisfactorily addressed all of the scientists' objections 
to the May-Johnson bill. It provided a full-time salaried civilian commission to 
be appointed by and responsible to the president. It made the commission the 
sole producer and distributor of fissionable materials, and the use of devices or 
processes controlled by common licensing, preventing private monopolies in the 
hands of industry that might slow or prevent research. 
The new bill included milder security provisions than May-Johnson: it did 
not give the committee powers to issue new regulations, and while the 
commission would control the release of new scientific information in the field, it 
was also responsible for the dissemination ofthat information. Moreover, the 
penalties for violations of these policies did not exceed those already laid out in 
the Espionage Act. The new bill mandated quarterly reports, which would serve 
to preserve openness and accountability from the new commission. 
Most valuable to the movement scientists was the tone of the bill toward 
peaceful applications of atomic energy and the possibility for international 
control. The bill explicitly stated that later international agreements would 
supersede any provisions of the bill, and made equal mention of peaceful and 
-, 
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military uses of atomic energy. The scientists were also encouraged by the 
promise for a balance between basic and applied research, and impartial support 
for government or independent laboratories. Overall, movement scientists found 
it very satisfactory, and, while making note of a few changes they would like to 
see, prepared to give the bill their full support.37 
Hearings on the McMahon bill in the SCAE began on January 22, and 
testimony was largely favorable until Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal's 
statement. Secretary Forrestal was of the opinion the the bill inadequately 
provided for discourse between the commission and the military as it did not 
explicitly provide for a liaison to that effect. This issue, addressed in the 
Federation of Atomic Scientists on January 28, was to become the primary point 
of contention in the debate over the McMahon bill. 
The Federation of Atomic Scientists sent as its witness a middle-aged 
biochemist named Harrison Davies, who began by declaring that the bill before 
the committee had "the strong support not only of more than fifteen hundred 
Manhattan Project scientists and engineers, but of thousands of other 
scientists."38 He went on to establish the movement's response to the demands 
for a military liaison: any semblance of military control would be contrary to 
American traditions of civilian government, and while communications with the 
military were clearly vital, a subject so important to foreign policy must be 
37 ibid, 273-275; Jessica Wang, American Scientists in an Age ofAnxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and 
the Cold War(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 18. Text of the bill is reproduced 
in Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World, 1939/1946. Vol. 1 ofA History of 
the Unites States Atomic Energy Commission. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 
1972). App. 1,714-22. 
38 quoted in Smith, 369. 
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entirely free of military governance. 
The McMahon bill continued to enjoy smooth sailing. On January 31 
President Truman sent a letter to Chairman McMahon supporting the civilian 
commission and other aspects of the bill. This letter made the front page of 
newspapers nationwide, and the Federation was quick to send out a press release 
endorsing the President's views. Secretary Forrestal's testimony was the only real 
opposition heard; on February 14 even Secretary ofWar Patterson testified in 
favor of civilian control, though clearly lacking enthusiasm. 
The bill hit rough waters only two days after Patterson's testimony, not 
from congressional actions but from an entirely external source. With the 
background ofworsening relations with the Soviets in the light of an aggressive 
speech by Stalin on February 9, on February 16 news broke that a spy ring had 
been uncovered in Canada. Twenty-two people had been arrested in Ottawa and 
were charged with passing information, including information about the bomb, to 
the Soviet Union.39 In early March, Stalin refused to pull troops out of Iran 
according to schedule, and on March 5 Churchill gave his "Iron Curtain" speech 
about the threat of growing Soviet dominance in eastern Europe and the need for 
relentless U.S. opposition. The Cold War was fast becoming reality, and the 
changing international climate shifted the ground on which the McMahon bill 
had been gaining support. Almost overnight, letters to Congress in support of the 
bill dwindled to a trickle.40 
The tide seemed to be rapidly turning against the movement scientists. On 
39 Wang, Scientists, 20-21. 
40 Smith, 375. 
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the twenty-second of February they got news that physicist Niels Bohr had been 
denied a visa. They also received word of a statement released by General Groves 
stating that "from disclosures in Senate committee hearings and loose talk among 
irresponsible scientists more information about the atomic bomb had leaked out 
in the last four weeks than in the entire course of the war. "41 It was clear that 
movement opponents were attempting to use the fears begun by the Canadian 
scare against the proponents of the McMahon bill. 
In this first substantial mustering of public opposition against the 
movement and its goals, we can see the line between science and politics become 
a little more solid in the popular consciousness. While the atomic bomb was a 
new presence on the world stage, the idea of traitors and spies, duplicitous and 
loyal to another nation, was an old one. With spying prominent in the public eye, 
the notion that scientists capable of building the atomic bomb had political 
opinions could be made to seem threatening: if they could be politically 
persuaded to serve another nation, America's atomic knowledge would escape. 
With such threats looming, the modern constitution's divide between scientific 
and political work is appealing and protective. 
On March 12, senator Arthur Vandenberg submitted an amendment 
creating a military liaison board and providing that "the Commission shall advise 
and consult with the Committee on all atomic energy matters which the 
Committee deems to relate to the common defense and security. The Committee 
shall have full opportunity to acquaint itselfwith all matters before the 
41 ibid. 
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Commission."42 The movement groups responded with two primary points, 
established earlier in Davies' testimony before the committee. First, that military 
control would run counter to U.S. tradition and the U.S. constitution, and second, 
that because they would stifle scientific progress, heightened levels of security 
would be detrimental to national security. 
On March 19, Thorfin Hogness, a University of Chicago chemist, went to 
Washington D.C. to "see what he could do about the Vandenberg amendment."43 
He was in frequent contact with McMahon and Condon, and soon managed a 
meeting with then Chief of Staff General Eisenhower. The general was 
enthusiastic about limiting military power with regard to atomic energy, and with 
his support Hogness and Vandenberg were able to re-word Vandenberg's 
amendment in a manner more acceptable to the scientists' movement. 
Although the final draft was not officially approved by any movement 
groups, some of whom felt Hogness could have gained more concessions had he 
asked for them, the new form was much more satisfactory than the old and was 
not actively opposed. The new amendment made the liaison committee 
responsible to the secretary ofwar and the secretary of the navy, and restricted its 
concern to military applications of atomic energy. Also, the troublesome wording 
granting the committee"opportunity to acquaint itselfwith all matters before the 
commission" was replaced with the statement that they should remain "fully 
infonned." The modified amendment was accepted by the committee April 2, 
with Senator McMahon abstaining. 
42 Ibid, 388-389. 
43 Ibid,403. 
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The House Committee continued to make changes with an eye toward 
heightened security concerns throughout the month ofApril. The information 
section, previously called "Dissemination of Information," was retitled "Control 
of Information," and where before all atomic information had been assumed open 
until declared restricted by the Commission, the April changes declared it to be 
the other way around. Furthermore, fines and penalties for willful transmission 
of information were doubled from the original draft, to $20,000, ten years 
imprisonment, or both. McMahon reported the amended bill to the Senate on 
April 19, and Federation leaders decided to ignore their objections and push the 
bill through as quickly as they could, considering it a compromise solution. After 
a long delay, the bill was passed by voice vote in the Senate in only two hours on 
Saturday, June 1. 
The bill went to the House Military Affairs Committee on June 10, and 
after two days of encouraging open hearings the Committee went into closed 
executive session. Rumors leaked out of crippling amendments being added 
during this session, among them the inclusion of two military men on the 
commission and presidential authorization for the manufacturing production, or 
acquisition of "any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic 
energy as a military weapon"44 The atomic scientists' movement groups increased 
their level of activity, passing resoluti9ns and calling on their supporters to send 
telegrams and letters urging passage of the Senate version of the bill. 
The bill went from the MilitaryAffairs Committee to the Rules Committee 
44 Ibid, 417. 
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on July 10, and while it was there Representative J. Parnell Thomas, though not a 
member of the committee, attempted to stall it by calling attention to alleged 
subversive activities being investigated by the House Un-American Activities 
Committee at Oak Ridge. While this diversion caused a briefbut intense alarm 
among congressmen and scientists alike, it was quickly dismissed as political 
maneuvering and didn't ultimately hold up the progress of the bill, which went to 
the house floor on July 16. 
Before the House, more anti-American allegations were hurled toward the 
bill's scientist supporters. In response to numerous attacks, movement groups 
were almost constantly sending out new calls for action, supporting the passage 
of the Senate version and opposing any number of potential changes. On July 20, 
the bill passed the House with seventy-one amendments by a vote of 265 to 79. It 
then went to a Senate-House committee, where the two versions were to be 
reconciled. 
As soon as the names of the joint committee members were made public, 
movement scientists initiated a campaign of telegrams, visits, and phone calls 
encouraging these congressmen to oppose military influence and overly severe 
security provisions. The result of these deliberations was not entirely in the 
scientists' favor. Included in the final version was the death penalty as 
punishment for intentional information leaks and wide FBI powers, but excluded 
were military participation and the House version of patent management. On 
July 26, the modified bill passed both houses by voice vote. President Truman 
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signed it into law on August 1.45 
Understandably, movement scientists were somewhat disappointed with 
this outcome. However, they took the bill's passage as an overall success and 
extended thanks to the many individuals, including Senators McMahon and 
Vandenberg, who championed the bill. While it contained several troublesome 
sections, the bill as passed did establish civilian control, and also retained the 
possibility of international compromises. 
GETTING DoWN TO BUSINEss: THE DRIVE FOR INTERNATIONAL CONrROL 
Perhaps the reason that the atomic scientists' movement is often viewed 
indifferently or even rather critically in retrospect in spite of its first pair of 
victories was that the great passion of the participants was for international 
control. While domestic control legislation had to be managed so as not to harm 
potential for international negotiations, the goal of the movement scientists was 
not nearly so modest: in short, they intended to save the world. 
Unlike national policy, for which there were established channels of 
influence, there was no clear mechanism for effecting political or scientific change 
worldwide. After months ofhigh-paced activism, politics on the international 
scale soon became months and then years ofwaiting. Furthermore, unlike the 
dramatic turns taken in the legislative battles, the international negotiations 
resulted not in a successful or rejected bill but instead dwindled into a U.N. 
committee deadlock by the spring of1948. However, all this is not to say that 
45 Ibid, 428-431. 
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movement scientists did not have a notable impact on the progress that was made 
toward international control of atomic energy. 
In some sense, the scientists' movement was concerned with international 
control in all of its actions: many objections to the May-Johnson bill as well as 
modifications to the McMahon act were based upon projected negative 
consequences for international negotiations. .As early as November of 1945 
movement scientists in Washington were working on detailed studies regarding 
the technical feasibility of inspection at various stages ofweapons production. In 
January of 1946 these studies were taken over by a committee appointed by the 
War Department and including several individuals involved in the scientists' 
movement, including Philip Morrison and R. F. Bacher of Los Alamos and headed 
by Manson Benedict, a gaseous diffusion specialist from Oak Ridge.46 Because 
these appointees held convictions in support of comprehensive international 
control of atomic energy, movement scientists were rightly confident that their 
work would be well taken care of. 
Like the themes underlying civilian control domestically, the atomic 
scientists' movement for international control hinged on the assertion that the 
atomic bomb created a world somehow fundamentally different from the world 
that had come before. Maintaining its position that the new world position put 
scientists in a new role, with regard to international control they made a further 
point: the political structures of the world must also be realigned. .As Arthur 
Compton wrote in the introduction to the book One World or None, "We now 
46 Ibid, 260. 
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have before us the clear choice between adjusting the pattern of our society on a 
world basis so that wars cannot come again, or of following the outworn tradition 
of self-defense, which if carried through to its logical conclusion must result in 
catastrophic conflict."47 Further tearing at the modern constitution, movement 
scientists in this moment make the claim that the atomic bomb, a scientific 
achievement, has the power to force down political boundaries lest war destroy 
them. Furthermore, these scientists asserted, they were the ones to bring the 
message ofpolitical reordering. By this point in the scientists' campaign, they 
were far removed from the confines of thinking along the bounds of the modern 
constitution. 
At about the same time that the War Department took over the 
movement's inspection studies, the State Department appointed a committee 
under Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson to draft a control plan. This 
committee in turn formed an advisory board headed by Tennessee Valley 
Authority head David Lilienthal. J. R. Oppenheimer was the board's chief 
scientist. As they were thoroughly engaged in domestic control issues at this 
time, the movement scientists were grateful that satisfactory action was being 
taken by the government. Following a familiar pattern established by the atomic 
scientists' movement work in the Senate, Oppenheimer opened the State 
Department group's activities with a two-day tutorial on atomic theory and 
nuclear physics, which was followed by a tour of Manhattan project facilities.48 
47 Arthur H. Compton, "Introduction," One World or None, eds Dexter Masters and Katherine Way 
(McGraw-HilI, 1946) V. 
48 Gregg Herken, Brotherhood ofthe Bomb, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002) 163. 
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Some scientists proposed a full u.S. moratorium on the production of 
bombs and fissionable materials in order to establish good faith in international 
negotiations.49 Others suggested that a control regime ought to include a 
temporary ban on nuclear power to avoid confusion in inspections. In early 1946, 
many scientists and diplomats, whether or not they were involved with the atomic 
scientists' movement, were willing to take risks in order to protect against an 
international arms race and establish grounds for nuclear peace.50 
In addition to the Benedict and Lilienthal committees, several unofficial 
groups were working on international control plans with the aid of scientists' 
movement advisers. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was 
spearheading a project led by political scientists James Shotwell and the 
Committee to Study the Organization of the Peace, which was the research branch 
for the American Association of the United Nations. Prior to the establishment of 
the Carnegie group, Shotwell organized meetings with movement leaders 
including Ureyand Szilard in October and November of1945. In January of 
1946, the Carnegie Endowment sponsored a conference in conjunction with the 
American Physical Society and the Federation ofAmerican Scientists council 
meetings; a number of movement scientists, including Manson Benedict of the 
inspection study, were in attendance. While a regular correspondence 
relationship was maintained between the Carnegie group and the movement 
scientists at Columbia University's SAM Lab, the report produced by the Carnegie 
49 New York Times, February 16, 1946, p. 12 (dated February 13, 1946.) Signers of the letter were L.C. 
Dunn, Irwin Edman, A. P. Evans, Selig Hecht, P. C. Jessup, R.M. McIver, Edgar Miller, F.e. Mills, 
George B. Pegram, I. I. Rabi, Jan Schilt, and C. S. Shoup. 
50 Smith, 450. 
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committee in June of 1946 was considered too conservative by the scientists' 
movement groups. 
A second committee working on international control issues was 
sponsored by Professor Quincy Wright, an international law expert at the 
University of Chicago. Wright was advised by the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, 
one of the most active scientist groups in this period. This committee produced a 
"Draft for a Convention on Atomic Energy" in April, 1946 providing for a U.N. 
control authority with branches for political planning, inspection, and 
administration. The administration branch would have authority to own and 
operate mining and production facilities, as well as to sponsor research. This 
plan also suggested a moratorium on the large-scale production of fissionable 
materials, to be reviewed after five years and, if appropriate, ended for the 
development of industrial atomic power under the supervision of the 
commission. Enforcement under this plan would depend upon an international 
court oflaw. 
Both of these reports were soon overshadowed by the proposal from the 
Lilienthal advisory board, which had swiftly come under the control of 
Oppenheimer. While Oppenheimer had before openly criticized the methods of 
the atomic scientists' movement, on the issue of international control they and he 
were in agreement. In fact, Oppenheimer had first outlined the plan he would 
promote to the advisory board at an Association ofLos Alamos Scientists' 
Meeting, where his plans to create "a world that is united, and a world in which 
war will not occur" were met with acclaim. Oppenheimer came to dominate the 
~
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advisory board through his intellect and charisma. While the advisory board's 
initial intention had been to present a variety of recommendations to the 
committee, Oppenheimer persuaded them to press for a single plan-- his. 
Oppenheimer's plan placed all control of atomic energy, from mining 
operations to bomb manufacture and power plants, with an international Atomic 
Development Authority. This plan also hinged on the ability to "denature" 
fissionable materials through the addition of contaminants so that they would be 
useful for civilian power production but useless in military applications. This 
assertion was based on rather shaky data, and was skeptically regarded by many 
scientists, many ofwhom worried that the "re-naturing" process would be too 
simple to carry out.51 
Because ofwidespread worry that denaturing would not be an effective 
mechanism for control, General Groves appointed a new committee, including 
Oppenheimer, to study the subject. This committee found that plants for re­
naturing would have to be specifically built, and that it would take years to 
process enough material to create weapons. The committee concluded with a 
caution: that without "reasonable assurance that such plants do not exist it would 
be unwise to rely on denaturing to insure an interval of as much as a year" but 
added that, within the framework of the State Department proposal, would be a 
helpful tool.52 In spite of this concern, the report was widely acclaimed by 
movement scientists and highly promoted in movement public relations 
campaigns. As Higginbotham later explained: "For the first time since the end of 
I 
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the war, we began to feel hopeful. We clasped the new bible in our hands and 
went out to ring doorbells."53 
One point particularly noteworthy within the context of this study is the 
emphasis in the Lilienthal plan, promoted by the movement scientists as well as 
Oppenheimer and several other establishment figures, for a regulatory agency 
also active in research. This provision was motivated by two factors: first, 
concern that active research was necessary to keep up with cutting-edge science, 
and second, acknowledgment that the project would require excellent scientists 
who would want to pursue scientific questions in addition to their service­
oriented work.54 Under this vision, scientists would have been required to play 
the dual-role ofworking scientist and public servant. This plan would have 
required many scientists to traverse the previously invisible networks between 
the modern spheres of science and society under the auspices of a government 
institution. As these scientists would have been simultaneously doing science 
and preforming regulatory duties, they cannot be partitioned into purified 
categories: this plan would have made their hybrid status explicit. 
The final advisory panel report, now known as the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report, was presented to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on March 17 with the 
full support of the Acheson committee. They explained: "We lay the report before 
you as the Board has submitted it to us 'not as a final plan, but as a place to begin, 
a foundation on which to build.' In our opinion it furnishes the most constructive 
analysis of the question of international control we have seen and a definitely 
S3 Smith, 461. 
S4 Smith,457. 
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hopeful approach to a solution of the entire problem."55 The report was leaked to 
the press on May 21, and officially released on May 28. 
In spite of both the committee's and the movement's hope for the 
Acheson-Lilienthal report, its potential was almost immediately quenched by 
White House planning. The day before the report was delivered to the State 
Department, Byrnes and Truman had selected the elderly financier Bernard 
Baruch to present the plan to the United Nations. Upon hearing of Baruch's 
appointment, Oppenheimer told ALAS president Higginbotham, "We're lost," 
while Higginbotham wrote in his journal, "When I read this news last night, I was 
quite sick."56 Neither the FAS nor any other movement group made any public 
comment, but movement scientists were concerned by the fact that Baruch was 
hostile to the publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report-which the movement 
groups had greatly anticipated and were striving to disseminate as widely as 
possible. This clear difference of opinion was troubling to the scientists' 
movement, which had viewed its rallying of public support as the best way to 
promote a mutual cause. While it was unclear at this moment exactly what 
Baruch's plans for the proposal was, there are suggestions that he never held 
much hope for it. Lilienthal wrote of Baruch and his advisers in his journal: "They 
talk about preparing the American people for a refusal by Russia."57 
Also troubling to the movement were the advisers Baruch selected: 
banking associates derided even byVannevar Bush as "Wall-Streeters." With the 
55 Smith,455. 
56 both quotes from Herken, 165. 
57 Quoted in Heken, 165. 
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urging of the Association of New York Scientists, a science adviser was sought 
from among those who had opposed military control and been working on issues 
of international control: the California Institute of Technology's Richard C. 
Tolman took this position in mid-May. Tolman had been closely affiliated with 
the Manhattan Project's administration but nonetheless had the trust of many 
movement scientists. His selection of Oppenheimer, Bacher, Compton, Thomas, 
Urey, Morrison, and Weisskopf, particularly the latter three, confirmed to the 
movement groups that Tolman was interested in taking their views into account. 
However, while a great many meetings took place between Baruch and his 
scientists' movement acquaintances, notably Albert Cahn of the Met Lab, it 
became clear that the discrepancies between Baruch's views and the Acheson-
Lilienthal report were significant. 58 
Where previously they had involved themselves closely and vocally with 
Washington politics, in this case the movement scientists restrained themselves, 
lobbying the public to express support for the plan but otherwise leaving the 
political maneuvering to the better-connected Oppenheimer. Sadly, it soon 
became clear that even Oppenheimer's connections and charm were not sufficient 
to prevent Baruch from altering the provisions and tone of the proposal. By the 
time Baruch went to the U.N. the plan he presented was more specific than 
before, with a definite target: the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that "the bases 
where Baruch was proposing to stockpile atomic bombs to use against would-be 
aggressors were 'all too obviously pointed at the U.S.S.R."'59 While the atomic 
58 Smith,467-468. 
59 Herken, 165. 
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scientists and others with hopes for an international agreement had tried to 
phrase the proposal in welcoming and neutral language in order to draw all 
nations into a lasting peace, Baruch's proposal presumed that the arms race, and 
the Cold War, had already begun, as it had in the minds of many in Washington. 
This targeted hostility would be reciprocated by the Soviet delegate at the U.N. 
On June 19, five days after Baruch introduced his position, the Soviet 
delegate Andrei Gromyko offered a vague counterproposal: a pledge by 
participating nations that they would not use, produce, stockpile, or maintain any 
nuclear weapons, and that any existing stockpiles would be destroyed within 
three months. By June 2slines had been drawn at the U.N.: nine of the twelve 
nations on the UNAEC approved the Baruch plan, Russia and Poland opposed it, 
favoring the Russian plan, and Holland was undecided. Gromyko's plan 
remained undefined, but the main point of contention was the issue of abolishing 
the security council veto on issues of nuclear enforcement. Baruch placed this 
issue as a top priority, declaring that the plan could not move be passed without 
it, and Gromyko was equally adamant that such a step was impossible. As 
mentioned in the previous discussion of the McMahon act, U.S.-Soviet tensions 
were heightening, and UNAEC negotiations certainly reflected this dynamic. 
Leaving this issue aside, a scientific and technical subcommittee was 
assembled by the second UNAEC committee; the U.S. representatives were 
Tolman, Bacher, and Oppenheimer. While these men had been administrators of 
the Manhattan Project and were not members of the movement, they were all 
firm supporters of the Acheson-Lilienthal act and had had a great deal of 
46 
communication with movement groups. Meetings of this subcommittee began on 
July 19 and drew heavily on the unclassified portions of the Benedict Committee's 
findings. 
Outside of the U.N., U.S. actions did not seem to reflect the cooperative 
tone they were trying to establish within the UNAEC. On July 1, the U.S. began 
nuclear tests at Bikini in what would become a minor public relations disaster for 
the movement. The first bomb dropped at Bikini did not do the "anticipated 
damage" to the fleet upon which it was dropped, only two of the 73 ships were 
sunk on impact, and press coverage implied that atomic weapons were not as bad 
as the movement had claimed. Over the next several days the damage reports 
rose, but it was clear that the initial impression stuck in the public mind. To 
many, it appeared that the nuclear bomb was "nothing more radical than the 
refinement of TNT over Chinese gunpowder. "60 
Within the government, the results of the Bikini test were polarizing. The 
President's commission concluded from the event that" if there is to be any 
security or safety in the world war must be eliminated," while the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff report urged large-scale nuclear research and development to promote 
national safety. These two views would become the points around which 
scientific and national opinion would split in the months and years to come. 
Over the summer, the movement groups' work for international control 
focused mainly on communication with Tolman with regard to freedom of 
information within the technical committee. The movement scientists held the 
60 Smith,478. 
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belief that the diverse Lilienthal board's unanimous decision was the result of 
their sharing the same facts about atomic energy. In the interests of promoting 
such agreement among the technical committee, the movement groups were 
intensely concerned that the foreign members be given sufficient information to 
make the proposal seem equally obvious. As was typical to the movement, this 
concern was based on the idea that with accurate knowledge, provided by 
scientists, all individuals were capable ofmaking intelligent decisions about 
atomic bombs. At a September 22-23 council meeting Oppenheimer assured the 
FAS council that up to this point the negotiations hadn't been affected by a lack of 
information, but qualified that what was currently available was not sufficient to 
fully draft a treaty. 
On September 26, the multinational scientific and technical committee 
issued an optimistic report which concluded that there was no significant 
technical barrier to control. The report declared that one of the best assurances 
of international cooperation was a strong and active community of scientists and 
the free exchange of scientific information, which would keep all countries aware 
of scientific progress and thus prevent important developments from being 
pursued in secret. They concluded their report by addressing quite specifically 
"the question posed by Committee 2, 'whether effective control of atomic energy 
is possible'" and concluded that, on a purely scientific and technical level, it was. 
"Whether or not it is politically feasible, is not discussed or implied in this report, 
nor is there any recommendation of the particular system or systems bywhich 
...L 
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effective control can be achieved."61 While its discussions may have been wide-
ranging, this committee of scientists was careful to fit its report into the 
framework of authority being established at the U.N. 
Bernard Baruch later said that the scientific and technical committee's 
report was the "first and almost the last time the Soviet delegation had agreed 
with the United States."62 While the movement was not directly involved in this 
pinnacle of pre-cold war cooperation, some of its members were. Furthermore, 
the contributions made by the feasibility studies performed a year earlier, and the 
continued pressure for international control, can be largely attributed to the 
efforts of the group as a whole. 
Following the unified statement from the scientific and technical 
committee, negotiations at the U.N. fell into a stalemate, and the movement 
scientists were unable to contribute. While they did not publicly voice their 
discouragement for fear of further harming the chance of success at the U.N., by 
March 5, 1947, the groups had all but given up. Though they still distributed and 
promoted public support for the Acheson-Lilienthal report, they had little hope of 
its passage. In the spring of 1948, a formal deadlock was declared and the 
committee dissolved. No comprehensive system ofinternational control was ever 
established. As the movement scientists had predicted, a massive arms race 
followed. 
61 Quoted in Smith, 488. 
62 Quoted in Smith, 489. 
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Chapter 2
 
The Atomic Scientists' Movement: Message and Methods
 
A survey of materials from the atomic scientists' movement reveals quite a 
lot about its goals, its methods, and its message. When encountered all at once, 
the letters, articles, pamphlets, films, and the book produced by the movement 
initially read as repetitive and monotonous: three years spent sounding the same 
drum. By looking at the context of these documents we can begin to understand 
movement origins and goals. They were created to convey the message that 
although before WWII genocide could only be carried out by a massive network 
of killers, now a nation could be wiped out in minutes by fleet of airplanes 
carrying bombs. 
The atomic scientists' movement believed in the ability of the American 
people to synthesize scientific knowledge and in the power of scientific knowledge 
. 
to spur good policies, and furthermore, believed that only an understanding of 
the scientific basis of atomic energy could bring about appropriate treatment of 
the new weapons. More than anything, the movement believed that the 
production and use of the atomic bombs created a moment in which it was 
impossible to draw a line between science and politics or between laws of nature 
and laws of society. Atomic bombs disrupted the fabric of the modern 
constitution and asserted in its place a highly networked world where scientists 
were responsible for the political and moral consequences of their work and 
citizens were called upon to learn about the nature of the atom. 
I 
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The atomic scientists' movement promoted its message through many 
media. They published articles in newspapers and magazines. They coordinated 
radio broadcasts and sent speakers across the country. They sent thousands of 
direct mailings to individuals and local organizations to raise awareness and to 
raise funds. They aided in the production of a feature film, The Beginning or the 
End, as well as a number of educational animated shorts, including One World or 
None and How to Live with the Atom. The Federation ofAtomic Scientists 
assembled a book, also called One World or None, and member groups of the 
National Committee for Atomic Information sponsored conferences on atomic 
education throughout the country. Movement scientists also spent many hours 
chatting with senators and political advisers, working to get their voices heard by 
lawmakers. 
Nearly all of the work done by the atomic scientists' movement was 
directed toward the general public. Its members did not seem to be interested in 
recruiting more scientists, although internal networking did bring their 
movement precipitous growth in its first year. At its core, the movement was 
founded on the belief that basic information about atomic energy was necessary 
for survival in the nuclear world. It did not claim that nuclear physics was 
simple, and many (though not all) of its publications go beyond basic 
propaganda: One World or None devotes several pages to the basic physics of 
nuclear reactions, and several more to the technical potential for power 
production. However, all of these things were explained at a level that did not 
require technical training. In the world as seen by the movement, training might 
.......
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be required to perform science, but restricting understanding to the experts was 
no longer serving the interests of humanity. 
This worldview fits securely within Bruno Latour's description of the 
modern, and amodern, world in which we live. In his 1991 book, We Have Never 
Been Modem, Latour calls our attention to 1989, "The Year ofMiracles." For 
Latour, 1989 designates a moment when the dissolution of the modern 
constitution became readily apparent. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
end of the Cold War, the world saw a triumph of the liberal governments of the 
west over the oppression found in the U.S.S.R., although that oppression sprang 
out ofthe intention to abolish "man's exploitation ofman". In the same year, the 
first world conference on the state of the planet was held, revealing that many of 
the capitalist policies of the western democracies had been wreaking 
unprecedented destruction on the planet, although those policies had been 
intended to bring humanity unlimited plenty. "After seeing the best of intentions 
go doubly awry, we moderns from the Western world seem to have lost some our 
our self-confidence," Latour reflects. "Should we not have tried to put an end to 
man's exploitation of man? Should we not have tried to become nature's masters 
and owners? Our noblest virtues were enlisted in the service ofthese twin 
missions, one in the political arena and the other in the domain of science and 
technology."63 In Latour's vision, 1989 represents a moment when the modern 
constitution was clearly in crisis, when it was impossible to understand the world 
within the context of fully divided spheres of science and society. 
63 Latour, 9. 
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The other end of the Cold War also represents such a moment. The 
catalyst was the atomic bomb, and the disruption was similar: for those in the 
scientists' movement at least, this was a time where the world as structured by 
the modern constitution no longer made sense. Latour's essay depends on terms 
such as "recently" to describe the transition between a "then," when the modern 
constitution was an effective model for describing the world, and "now," when it 
is inadequate, failing to account for the proliferation of "hybrids," that cross the 
boundaries between political and technical knowledge. In this chapter, I will 
examine the texts left behind by the scientists' movement to find in them the 
common themes of introducing the world to a new framework, placing their 
technical knowledge in the hands of non-experts, and encouraging action under 
the new world model. 
A CAUSE IN ITSELF: THE PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN 
Alongside the legislative and policy-oriented activities ofthe atomic 
scientists' movement was a continual focus on the need for immediate and 
extensive public education. While the creation of an informed public was a 
powerful political tool for the movement's two congressional episodes, it was 
perceived as more than a political necessity: for many people involved with the 
movement, public education was a primary goal. As Einstein explained in a 1946 
New York Times Magazine article, anyone "if told a few facts [could] understand 
that this bomb and the danger of war is a very real thing, and not something far 
1i ____ u 
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away." "To the village square we must carry the facts of atomic energy," he wrote. 
"From there must come America's voice."64 
In November 1945 the Federation ofAtomic Scientists joined with eleven 
civilian groups to organize the National Committee on Atomic Information 
(NCAl), which became the Federation's principle educating agent. Through this 
committee, it used the information-dispersal apparatus of its member 
organizations to promote its message, sending speakers and newsletters to 
church groups, labor unions, and the League ofWomen Voters. It published 
booklets such as the tri-fold leaflet Educationfor Survival, ofwhich thirty 
thousand copies had been sold by June 1946.65 
Educationfor Survival was directed at organizations and individuals, 
telling them what they could do to "help build world-wide freedom from fear" and 
"to make war obsolete before the atomic bomb makes man obsolete." This 
pamphlet begins by setting out the three points which formed the backbone of all 
movement activities: "(1) There can be no secret. (2) There can be no defense. (3) 
There must be world control." It encouraged groups to devote meeting time to 
speakers or discussions of atomic energy, to encourage radio stations to broadcast 
announcements, features, and discussions, and to work with newspapers, 
libraries, and local merchants to spread information and awareness of the atomic 
bomb. The leaflet also offered tips for sponsoring and directing a community 
forum devoted to the subject of atomic energy. Appropriate to the National 
Committee for Atomic Information's purpose as an educational organization (and 
64 Quoted in Wang, "Scientists," 323 and 330. 
65 Smith, 324. 
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its tax-exempt status), Educationfor Survival did not pursue an explicit policy 
agenda, but rather encouraged readers to write to Senator McMahon for 
"committee hearings and copies of bills" and to "Let your congressmen know that 
you expect them to find a way to banish from the world both the causes and the 
weapons ofwar, regardless of how many precedents and prejudices must be set 
aside." Finally, it offered a list ofbooks and articles to read, including a number 
of materials that could be ordered from the NCAl for five to fifty cents apiece or 
at discounted bulk rates.66 
The NCAl functioned primarily as a producer and distributor of nuclear 
education materials such as Educationfor Survival. While the sheer volume of 
material distributed is impressive, the group's impact can also be observed in 
activities sponsored by member groups: the Young People's Division of the 
Congregational Church re-enacted the hearings of the Senate Special Committee 
on Atomic Energy at a summer conference with three hundred delegates. 
"Atomic Information" was the theme for the American Association of University 
Women's annual dinner. Civilian and international control were the first items 
on the two-year agenda of the League ofWomen Voters.67 
The scientists produced two newsletters: the Bulletin ofthe Atomic 
Scientists, first published in December 1945 as the mouthpiece of the Atomic 
Scientists of Chicago, and Atomic Information, produced by the NCAl for use by 
66 Leaflet, "Education for Survival," item PMRH 48/45, Monsignor Reynold Hillenbrand: Printed Material 
(PMRH), University ofNotre Dame Archives, Hesburgh Library, Notre Dame, Indiana. 
67 Smith,325. Although Smith frequently mentions that the NCAI worked with labor, youth, church, and 
women's groups, the examples she offers (and I therefore mention) are primarily women's groups. I 
believe that this emphasis simply reflects the fact that there were many social action groups for women 
in this period rather than a special effort on the part of the NCAI to seek out such groups. 
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the organization's many affiliated groups. The Bulletin, edited by Eugene 
Rabinowitch, was intended for scientists as well as a lay audience. This periodical 
was filled with articles about atomic science in politics and always included an 
editorial promoting the goals of the movement. By the end of its first year, the 
Bulletin had a circulation of about sixteen thousand.68 Atomic Information 
contained bibliographies, discussion guides, lists of articles, articles of popular 
interest, and cartoons. Itwas similarly successful, and in early April 1946 it had a 
circulation often thousand.69 Clearly, in its first year, the scientists' movement 
was a powerful force in the province of atomic education. 
One World or None 
The scientists' book One World or None, published March 18, 1946, was 
conceived and edited by the Met Lab's Katharine Way and her friend Dexter 
Masters of McGraw-Hill. Itwas priced at a dollar per paperback copy and sold 
nearly one hundred thousand copies.70 The list of contributors was itself 
impressive, among them Einstein, Bohr, Oppenheimer, and Wigner: not only a 
roster of the protest movement but of mid-century physics itself. 
The book was a series of teaching essays, written by some of the foremost 
physicists of the time using metaphor and analogy to explain the rudiments of 
atomic physics alongside promoting political and social goals for the management 
of nuclear science. The atomic scientists' movement was grounded in educational 
68 Ibid, 296. 
69 Ibid, 324. 
70 Ibid, 289-90. 
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goals and One World or None provided the ideal platform for its message. Unlike 
radio spots or magazine editorials, in the book its supporters were able to 
thoroughly contextualize their arguments. While some of the movement's other 
efforts may have held a larger audience, only in the book was it able to bring its 
methods fully into concert with its core principles. 
Phillip Morrison, who had worked on the bomb at Los Alamos and 
Chicago, was one of the first Americans to see the ruins of Hiroshima. For One 
World or None, however, he spends only a few pages on Japan. The rest of his 
essay, "If the Bomb Gets Out of Hand," is devoted to the projected impact of a 
nuclear blast in New York City. His reasoning for this presentation is 
straightforward: "The streets and the buildings of Hiroshima are unfamiliar to 
Americans. Even from pictures of the damage realization is abstract and remote. 
A clearer and truer understanding can be gained from thinking of the bomb as 
falling on a city, among buildings and people, which Americans know well."71 
Harlow Shapley, astronomer and director of the Harvard College 
Observatory, illuminated the issue of atomic energy by departing from bombs 
entirely, discussing instead the process that led to the discovery that atomic 
energy fueled the sun and stars. After expressing the substantial amount of 
energy tied up in matter and released by stellar reactions, Shapley concluded with 
an allusion to the crisis on which the rest of the book focuses. He recalls the 
supernova observed on July 4, 1054, later identified as the crab nebula. Such a 
catastrophic event, he notes, is "the result, apparently, of the mishandling by a 
71	 Phillip Morrison, "If the Bomb Gets Out ofHand." One World or None, eds Dexter Masters and 
Katherine Way. (McGraw-Hill, 1946),3 . 
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star of its resources in atomic energy." 
In the third chapter, bomb pioneer Eugene Wigner set out by explaining 
his goals, which serve as an elegant statement of the movement's educational 
objectives as a whole: 
Only very few of us can design or construct a steam 
engine or prepare an explosive compound, and it is 
not the purpose of this chapter to serve as a textbook 
on atomic engineering. However, most of us are 
familiar with the basic phenomena that are exploited 
in the steam engine and the ordinary explosives. 
Atomic explosives already influence international 
relations more profoundly than ordinary explosives, 
and it is not impossible that atomic energy may 
compete with our present sources of power in a few 
years. Tomorrow the basic facts about atomic power 
will be common knowledge. Even today a closer 
acquaintance with these facts may increase our 
foresight and help us to fonn our opinions both on 
questions of internal affairs and on those of foreign 
policies.72 
Wigner went on to explain atomic reactions in comparison to more common 
combustion reactions, such as those ofburning coal, or the explosion of 
nitroglycerin. He explained the significance of the equation E=me and the 
importance of isotope separation in the production ofbombs. He described a 
chain reaction and the essence of the atomic bomb, as well as how nuclear 
explosives differ from nuclear power production. This careful and concise essay 
did not offer any information that was not available through other reports, but it 
presented it in a clearly explained and precise way. Wigner's coal analogy was an 
effective tool for explaining why scientific understanding was vital for the 
72 Eugene P. Wigner, "Roots of the Atomic Age," One World or None, 11. 
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American electorate: in order for the public to make responsible decisions about 
managing steam engines or coal power plants, they must be aware that such 
engines run on coal, which is mined from the ground. Likewise, to make 
decisions about nuclear administration, Americans had to become educated 
about the needs and limitations of nuclear energy. A similarly precise chapter 
with charts and diagrams was included on the potential and demands of nuclear 
power production. 
A chapter by General H.H. Arnold offered a jarring glimpse into military 
decision-making. He introduced the idea of economy and profit factor in war, 
using the terms of economics to describe both weapons and the damage they 
caused in monetary terms. According to General Arnold's economy, it is best to 
use weapons that destroy more area per cost unit, and it is only profitable to use 
weapons that cost the enemy more through the destruction they cause than it cost 
you to build and use the weapon. In much the same way that Wigner provided a 
careful and concise tour of nuclear theory, General Arnold presents a chillingly 
blunt analysis ofmilitary air strategy. His analysis came to this conclusion: that 
destruction by air is too easy, and therefore too costly for potential targets. 
Therefore, "No effort spent on international cooperation will be too great if it 
assures prevention of this destruction. "73 As a specialist in military decision­
making, General Arnold had a similar educational goal in this essay as the 
scientists did in their contributions: in a world where destructive power is so 
great, civilians must be educated enough to understand military decisions on 
73 General H.H. Arnold, "Air Force in the Atomic Age," One World or None, 27. 
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military terms. 
The essays continued in an explanatory tone, providing clear and concise 
arguments for the reader. Louis Ridnour's "There Is No Defense" explored the 
possibility of anti-bomb technologies and concluded that even after taking on the 
expense of developing anti-missile devices a 100% effectiveness rate could not be 
achieved, and that when dealing with atomic bombs, anything less than 100% 
would result in unacceptable losses. Edward Condon's "The New Technique of 
Private War" examined the possibilities for the anonymous placement of atomic 
devices in buildings, shipping crates, pianos, or filing cabinets. He recalled 
Oppenheimer's statement before Congress when asked whether there was a 
device that could detect a bomb hidden in a closed crate: "Yes, there is such an 
instrument. It is a screwdriver, with which the investigator could painstakingly 
open case after case until he found the bomb."74 
The last essay in the book to depend purely on technical knowledge was 
"How Close is the Danger," in which Frederick Seitz and Hans Bethe estimated 
the ability ofother nations to build a nuclear weapon based on available 
information, scientific manpower, and physical resources. Comparing the 
publicly available knowledge to their private knowledge ofwhat is actually 
required, they conclude that for any industrialized nation, including the U.S.S.R, 
six years was a reasonable guess-- a far cry from the estimate of 60 years 
promoted by General Groves. 
Later essays in the book address less technical matters regarding the 
74 E.U. Condon, "The New Technique ofPrivate War," One World or None, 40. 
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nuclear threat. In "An Atomic Arms Race and its Alternatives," Irving Langmuir 
offered a thoughtful analysis of social and political tensions with Russia. 
Langmuir had attended the 220th anniversary Moscow meeting of the U.S.S.R. 
Academy of Sciences in June of 1945 and returned with a conviction that the 
Russians were well on their way toward developing the bomb. He also brought 
hopes for the possibility for international control of nuclear weapons, but only if 
the two nations made a genuine attempt to communicate without relying on 
"slogans or idealized principles." "Ifwe are to get along with other nations that 
have different ideals," he wrote, "we cannot insist that our concepts of freedom 
and democracy shall prevail everywhere. Such matters involve compromise and 
wise statesmanship. They are not to be settled by means of slogans."75 
Harold Urey examined the sacrifices that would have to be made should an 
arms agreement fail in "How Does it All Add Up?": "the citizens of the country 
will know less and less in regard to vital questions... and finally must accept 
decisions in regard to public affairs blindly and from a few men in power."76 
These essays make a good compliment, for while Langmuir encourages that 
American principles be compromised in the interests of negotiation, Urey 
declares that those same principles are as good as lost should atomic weapons 
remain uncontrolled. It is interesting that neither of these men attempted to 
justify their legitimacy in writing about national ideologies instead of nuclear 
arms. In the context of this book, such writing was natural and did not need to be 
justified (although some critics would later take objection to this.) 
75 Irving Langmuir, "An Atomic Arms Race and Its Alternatives," One World or None, 51. 
76 Harold Urey, "How Does it All Add Up?," One World or None, 57. 
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Atelling quirk of this book is that, while Langmuir and Urey treated 
almost exclusively non-technical topics, it is not until after these essays that a 
formal break is placed between the "facts" and the tentative "solutions" regarding 
the problem of the atomic bomb. The implication here is that all essays before 
this break were factual, while those following contain matters of opinion. As in 
all of their publications, the movement does not choose to draw a line between 
scientific and social concerns, but rather between matters of fact and matters of 
speculation. The modern constitution's division of science and society is entirely 
flouted in this text. 
The remaining four chapters in the book discuss plans for international 
control. Leo Szlilard contemplates "Can We Avert an Arms Race by an Inspection 
System?" He proposes that the international scientific community provides the 
best resource for control, but that first the issue of loyalty must be redefined. 
Once a control treaty is signed and ratified, Szilard suggests that the President 
might request all scientists and engineers to report any secret violations to the 
overreaching agency-- after modifying the espionage act to make such reporting 
legal, of course. Additionally, Szilard would require all scientists to spend some 
time each year abroad, giving them the opportunity to further cultivate 
international relationships, and potentially to report violations and request 
asylum from their home country. Szilard calls all of this an "experiment with 
problems ofhuman relationships"77: his scientific terminology is perhaps the only 
thing that reveals his own scientific background. 
77 Leo Szilard, "Can We Avert an Arms Race by an Inspection System?," One World or None, 63. 
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Szilard's chapter could certainly be considered naive. His belief that either 
Russia or the United States would so easily encourage sharing technology or 
reporting secrets assumed a worldview that was not widely held. However, 
Szilard's view was tempered somewhat by his acknowledgment of limitations: to 
ease inspection pressures, all nations will have to renounce developing atomic 
power for the next ten to 15 years, he writes, and the ultimate goal ofworld 
government can only be achieved once a comprehensive arms agreement and 
inspection system is reached. While Szilard makes radical proposals, his purpose 
is well in line with the premise of the movement: this post-atomic age is different 
than before, and we must change our ways of thinking to echo the changedworld. 
The final three chapters, one by political columnist Walter Lippman, one 
byAlbert Einstein, and one attributed to the Federation ofAmerican (Atomic) 
Scientists, all likewise serve as calls to action. Lippman examines the possibilities 
ofworld government in the context ofAmerican traditions by way ofthe 
Federalist Papers and new international standards, represented by the 
Nurenburg trials, concluding that an international control regime holding 
individuals rather than states responsible for violations will allow for the 
prevention of new arms without eliminating the Security Council veto. Einstein's 
short piece, "The Way Out," proposes the immediate creation of a supranational 
organization with its own military force. 
The concluding piece, written by the Federation ofAmerican (Atomic) 
Scientists (FAS), recognized the book's primary limitation: it gave no solution. 
The politically-oriented pieces were incomplete and, moreover, merely ideas. 
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However, this chapter, "Survival is at Stake," offered a final call to action. It 
asked, "What can you do?" and answered: 
For one thing, now that you have read this 
book, discuss it with your friends-- don't lay it aside. 
A great decision rests on how well you and your 
elected representatives understand and act on the 
facts and proposals presented in these pages. 
Continue your education for survival by being 
well informed. Ask for the releases and reports on 
what is happening as prepared by the scientists and 
issues by the National Committee on Atomic 
Information. 
Make sure that your Senators and 
Congressmen know that you are aware of the 
unprecedented gravity of the problem. Urge them to 
act with courage and vision in solving the problem of 
the atomic bomb within the framework of the new 
ideas that, as this book shows, are necessary to the 
solution. 
Time is short. And survival is at stake.78 
It is telling that this final chapter did not emphasize a specific plan ofaction, but 
rather encouraged continued education as the path to survival. While it seems 
strange to hinge something as significant as "survival" on such a vague set of 
recommendations, it follows with the general belief of the movement that 
education in the "new ideas" emerging from the atomic age would lead to correct 
action. 
The FAS chapter, in its tone and content, resembled the many magazine 
articles and newspaper opinion pieces with which the movement flooded the 
country. However, the book as a whole reveals that the movement was about 
78	 Federation of American (Atomic) Scientists, "Survival is at Stake," One World or None, 79. The 
strange parenthesis in the group's name are meant to reflect the recent merging of the Federation of 
Atomic Scientists' and its partner organization, open to all scientists and engineers, the Federation of 
American Scientists. For more on this merge, see Smith, chapter 9. 
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more than scare tactics and propaganda. The hundred thousand copies sold and 
distributed indicate that the information contained in these pages was widely 
available, and the numerous conferences convened on the topic, including the 
"Pacific Northwest College Congress on The Student's Stake in the Atomic Age" 
featuring Philip Morrison at Reed College, imply that it was widely discussed.79 
In many ways, education was at the heart of the atomic scientists' 
movement: through teaching the public what they knew and what they thought 
about it, these scientists set out to change the way the country and the world 
thought. While their shorter appeals, such as those on the radio, often concluded 
with pleas for action: "Support the McMahon Act!," or "Promote the Acheson-
Lilienthal Report!," their book did not. This reflects their common belief that 
proper education would serve as well if not better than propaganda. They took 
from their own experience of consensus in the scientific community the (perhaps 
naIve) lesson that full knowledge of the facts of atomic energywould inevitably 
lead any reasonable person inevitably to the same political conclusions they 
themselves reached. 
One World or None was not universally well received, and much criticism 
was based on the supposed division between scientific and political thinking. 
This was less a matter of expertise as one of privilege: the assertion was not that 
the scientists did not address political complications, but instead that they could 
not possibly understand what they were dealing with in the political sphere. An 
example of this strategy is seen in Elmer Davis' response to One World or None, 
79	 Schedule ofMeetings, Pacific Northwest College Conference, April 1946, Reed College Library 
Archives, Portland, Oregon. 
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"No World, if Necessary." In the Saturday Review ofLiterature, he wrote: 
It is generally recognized that one of the 
compensations of the atomic bomb is that it has set 
large numbers of scientists to thinking, for the first 
time, as citizens; but political thinking that gets 
anywhere requires certain disciplines of its own, 
which few scientists yet appear to have mastered. 
When the authors talk as experts in their own field, 
however, they are convincing.80 
Later, Davis continued on this track, declaring that the scientists' weakness was 
their "terrifying unawareness of politics, of the difficulty of getting things done in 
a field more complex than nuclear science."81 Dismissing outright the analysis 
made by Langmuir, Szilard, and Einstein, his criticism is was not so much that 
the scientists didn't have anything constructive to say in the realm of politics, but 
rather that, as scientists, they were not qualified to say anything at all. Davis, 
political commentator and one-time head of the Office ofWar Information, 
presented himself as holding a much more qualified place from which to speak, 
although he, like the scientists, did not offer a solution to the problem of atomic 
control. In short, critics like Davis seemed to argue that as the scientists were not 
politicians, their political speech was not valid. Criticism such as Davis' shows 
the beginning of a campaign to defend the modern constitution's view of science 
and society: while scientists' thoughts on science were interesting, scientists' 
thoughts on society were not noteworthy. 
80 Elmer Davis, "No World, IfNecessary," The Saturday Review a/Literature (March 30, 1946) 7. 
81 Ibid. 
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MULTIMEDIA: THE MOVEMENT IN MAGAZINES, RADIO, AND FILM 
As an addition to their educational mailings, the scientists engaged in a 
successful campaign of media saturation. They hired a publicist and writer 
named Michael Amrine, and published articles under the names of prominent 
scientists in Collier's, The Saturday Review o/Literature, Life, The Rotarian, 
and many other diverse publications. They made connections with editors Bruce 
Bliven of The New Republic, Freda Kirchwey of The Nation, Norman Cousins of 
The Saturday Review, and others, securing a media base friendly to their cause. 
They also had excellent connections in radio, working with well-known 
personalities Raymond Gram Swing and Clifton Utley, as well as airing and 
publishing advertisements through the Advertising Council. Harold Urey, J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, James Franck, and Hans Bethe all made public 
appearances on the intermission program of the NewYork Philharmonic.82 It 
was through these diverse media channels that the scientists mobilized their 
support base: of the letters that poured into the Princeton office of the Emergency 
Committee of the Atomic Scientists, many more of them were in response to 
treatments in the media than to direct mailing. The movement initiated 
connections with diverse individuals through these media outlets. 
In October of 1945, Edward Tompkins of Clinton Labs was contacted by a 
former high-school science student: Hollywood actress Donna Reed. In his reply 
to Reed, Tompkins expressed surprise that Hollywood had not already put 
forward a film on the atomic bomb. In response, she phoned him to introduce 
82 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn ofthe Atomic Age 
(Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1994),62. 
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her husband Tony Owens, a film agent who was thrilled with the idea. While 
Reed did not act in the film, this chance connection made the Federation of 
Atomic Scientists consultants on a film depicting (with considerable license) the 
story of the atomic bomb's creation. The move-making process was predictably 
tumultuous, as atomic scientists and Hollywood producers tend to value different 
things in a motion picture, and the eventual product, M-G-M's The Beginning or 
the End, did not receive an official endorsement from the FAS. Although initially 
eager to participate in the creation of a major motion picture, movement 
scientists were uncomfortable with the exaggerated or counterfactual depictions 
in the film. 83 
The movement's smaller film projects were significantly more satisfactory 
to the sponsoring groups, as they allowed much more creative control on the part 
of the scientists. The NCAl sponsored a film released in the fall of 1946 by Film 
Publishers and produced by Philip Ragan called One World or None. This one-
reel animated film strip used striking images, including one projecting concentric 
circles of crosses onto the map ofChicago in order to indicate the toll of an atomic 
bomb dropped in that city.84 This film received distribution in more than 20 
major cities, including Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, New York, San 
Francisco, and Seattle.8S 
The association in Philadelphia collaborated on a cartoon strip, How to 
83 Smith, 316. 
84 Advertisement for Film Stills, 1947, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling Papers, Peace Collection, 13.3.4, 
Valley Library, Corvallis, Oregon. 
85 List of Local Theatrical Film Exchanges, undated, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling Papers, Peace 
Collection, 13.4.2a, Valley Library, Corvallis, Oregon. 
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Live with the Atomic Bomb, and movement scientists in Chicago were the 
technical consultants for a film called The Atomic Bomb by the Society ofVisual 
Education.86 When the "March ofTime" film Atomic Power was released in 
August 1946, Harold Oram sent letters on encouraging theater owners to show 
the film and promote it to their colleagues. Oram's letters also asked for critical 
feedback from these theater owners, noting that "Professor Einstein would... be 
interested in knowing your re-action to this film after you have seen it, and 
particularly your judgment as to how effective it is likely to prove to the theatre 
going public. "87 
The movement's intense concern with popular media only reinforces the 
fact that it's message was intended for mass consumption. Its highly critical view 
of misinformation, as seen in The Beginning or the End, shows that its intention 
was not just public awareness but public education. Through media connections, 
movement groups were able to spread their message farther than they ever could 
have through mailings alone. 
TELEGRAMS, LEITERS, AND FUND RAISING: FROM THE FILES OF THE ECAS 
One World or None provides a close look at the arguments made by 
movement scientists in favor of international control of atomic energy. We can 
learn from it what the scientists were saying to the public at large, and can judge 
by its distribution numbers how widely it was circulated. We will now look at the 
86 Smith,319. 
87 Harold Oram to A.H. Blank., Tri-States Theatre Corp, August 1, 1947, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling 
Papers, Peace Collection, 13.3.1, Valley Library, Corvallis, Oregon. 
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other extreme of communication scale: to letters and telegrams individually sent 
to increase support and funds for the movement. The initial wave of telegrams 
was mailed to known supporters, friends and colleagues. These people often 
responded with mailing lists of their friends, and by this method the campaign 
was expanded, although with frequent duplication of names. One of the appeal 
mailings from the Emergency Committee ofAtomic Scientists began with this 
notice: "We are grateful to the many friends who have offered us mailing lists. If 
you have received a copy of this appeal, you can help us by passing on the 
duplicate to a friend."88 
While the atomic scientists' movement in general was not characterized by 
prominent scientists in leadership roles, the archive I have for study represents 
the sole exception: the Emergency Committee ofAtomic Scientists (ECAS), 
chaired by Albert Einstein. The texts produced by the ECAS provide a striking 
picture of how the scientists' movement worked on an individual level. 
The genesis of the ECAS is unclear. It appears to have been born out of a 
decision by the director of the NCAI, Daniel Melcher, who in the midst of public 
fervor over civilian control in the spring of 1946 felt that public support existed 
for even larger efforts if it could be harnessed. New York fundraiser Harold Oram 
estimated that $20,000 a month could be raised with proper encouragement, and 
suggested that a prominent scientist 9ught to head such a drive. With this in 
mind, Melcher and Oram went to Princeton and met with Einstein. Although 
how exactly is unclear, the idea for an Emergency Committee emerged from this 
A Statement bye the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, undated, Eva Marie and Linus
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meeting: the first appeal for funds brought in nearly $100,000.89 Its provisional 
ruling committee also included Hans A. Bethe of Cornell, formerly of Los Alamos, 
Edward U. Condon of the National Bureau of Standards and President of the 
American Physical Society, Leo Szilard of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory, and 
Harold C. Urey of the University of Chicago, formerly doing uranium work at 
Columbia University. 
This initial appeal was carried out through telegrams, letters, and appeals 
published in magazines and newspapers. The appeal wired to potential 
supporters in the last week of May, 1945 certainly conveyed the urgent tone 
implied by the new group's name. It declared that "our world faces [a] crisis as 
yet unperceived by those possessing power to make great decisions for good or 
evil," and continued with one ofEinstein's most striking phrases from this period: 
"The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of 
thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." 90 
The Emergency Committee's primary goal was to raise funds in order to 
further atomic information campaigns carried out by the NCAl, and so its appeal 
had to cover two points: first, that the atomic bomb created an urgent world 
situation, and second, that money for information dispersal would help. 
Therefore, for the same reason that One World or None touted the power of 
education, the ECAS telegram emphasized that widespread and dangerous 
89 Smith, 325. 
90 Telegram, undated, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling Papers, Peace Collection, 13.4.2a, Valley Library, 
Corvallis, Oregon. While the telegram has no date, it is appended to a letter dated June 15, 1946, which 
indicates that the attached telegram was first sent "three weeks ago." Therefore, we can date the initial 
appeal telegram in the last week of May, 1946. 
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ignorance remained: not even lawmakers truly perceived the danger. 
Next, the scientists established their personal relationship to the global 
dilemma: "We scientists who released this immense power have overwhelming 
responsibility in this world life and death struggle to harness [the] atom for [the] 
benefit of mankind and not for humanity's destruction."91 The appeal did not 
specify that the scientists were needed for their scientific expertise, but rather 
that they had a special responsibility to insure that their creations are properly 
managed. .As elsewhere, there was a specific identification of the scientists as 
scientists, but no line between their political and scientific responsibilities. To 
the contrary, in this appeal they framed their purpose in human-oriented terms: 
"Bethe, Condon, Szilard, Urey, and Federation ofAmerican Scientists join me in 
this appeal, and beg you to support our efforts to bring realization to America 
that mankind's destiny is being decided today now at this moment." While their 
methods were largely pedagogical, these men did not see their role simply as the 
nation's science teachers. The knowledge they had to convey was revealing and 
transformative; they believed that their message would change the path of 
history. 
Finally, the telegram asked for funds: "two thousand dollars at once for a 
nationwide campaign to let the people know that new type of thinking essential if 
mankind is to survive and move toward higher levels." The message concluded, 
"We ask your help in this fateful moment as [a] sign that we scientists do not 
stand alone." This last line is an important one in sorting out the overall message 
91 ibid. The lack of articles in this quotation is due not to bad grammar but rather to the fact that the 
message was conveyed via telegram. I have chosen to insert them here for clarity. 
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of the movement. Because so much ofthe movement's message breaks down 
traditional lines dividing scientific and political work, it commonly elicited fears 
of technocracy-- although its members did not seek political office for themselves, 
some thought that their incursions into the realm of politics implied that they 
wanted to take over that space as well, and perhaps control society in the same 
way that they controlled their laboratories. In the framework of the modern 
constitution, this confusion makes a kind of sense. The scientists were rejecting a 
strict division between the work of science and the governance of society, they 
were making connections between them in an overtly public way. However, as 
they explained in this document, the objective was not to take over that other 
territory, but instead to show that it was not so "other" after all. The connections 
between science and society as interpreted by the atomic scientists' movement 
were not newly forged, but they were newly important and deserved recognition. 
The movement scientists wanted, most of all, not to stand alone. 
Later in its campaign, the ECAS distributed a half-sheet flier along with a 
coupon to be mailed in with contributions to the campaign. This mailing listed 
six points "accepted by all atomic scientists," which outlined the points covered in 
One World or None: atomic bombs are cheap and increasingly destructive, there 
is no defense, there is no secret to be kept from other nations, attempts at 
preparedness will erode our social order, bombs will be used in the next war and 
will destroy civilization, and the only solution is international control and an end 
to war. Only the first three of these points can be considered technical in nature, 
but no distinction was made within the context of the piece. 
J..
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The statement declared the mission of the ECAS, "to see that these simple 
facts become known to the public," and further declares that "The committee 
does not propose to make governmental policy, either on the national or 
international level. Its purpose is to make available an understanding of the 
Atomic Era on which such policy must depend."92 In discussing the role of 
science in society as expressed by these documents, the movement's 
unconventional standpoint challenges us even as we begin to understand it. The 
committee does not, they declared, want to make policy. However, they wanted 
to offer an understanding of the Atomic Era that such policy would rest on. The 
understanding that the scientists offered was not purely scientific: it merged with 
social and political concerns as well. It split away from and burst through the 
modern constitution, and so is difficult to characterize in the terms we are used to 
using for such things: scientific, social, political. To use Bruno Latour's term, the 
movement's understanding of the atomic bomb was essentially a hybrid, as much 
of a hybrid as the bomb itself. 
92 A Statement by the Emergency Committee ofAtomic Scientists, undated, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling 
Papers, Peace Collection, 13.4.10, Yaney Library, Corvallis, Oregon. 
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Chapter 3
 
Movement's End: Repression and Changing Views of Science
 
Beginning in the fall of 1946, the atomic scientists' movement clearly 
entered a period of decline. Despite income from sales ofOne World or None, 
membership dues, and a number of New York fund-raising dinners, the 
Federation ofAmerican Scientists (FAS) was badly in debt, owing $10,000 by 
September of 1946. Due to its non-profit tax status, the ECAS was not able to 
fund the partisan group, and it was only through last-minute donations from 
members that the FAS stayed afloat.93 Furthermore, the ECAS itself pursued its 
last drive for funds in the spring of 1948. 
In addition to financial troubles, the movement groups faced both external 
and internal challenges: while struggling to fight accusations of subversive 
activity and denial of necessary security clearances, the organizations were also 
fighting internally about communists within their ranks and the appropriateness 
of political speech. As the decade closed, the atomic scientists' movement had 
come full circle with regard to scientists' role in society. Its members had 
emerged from war convinced that the atomic bomb had forever changed the role 
of science in the world, but by 1949 were chiding one another for speaking 
outside of their sphere of authority, and shrinking from public statement on 
matters of science policy with the claim that such things were "outside their field 
of competence."94 
93 Smith,494. 
94 Ibid, 521. 
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FINANCIAL TROUBLES 
The $10,000 accrued FAS debt in August 1946 was particularly impressive 
given that its entire expenditures from January to August of that year was only 
$23,368.24. Although the Emergency Committee, founded three months before, 
was having no trouble with fundraising, it was not able to contribute to the FAS 
and maintain tax-exempt status-- Emergency Committee funds went primarily to 
the Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists and the NCAl. While some FAS leaders 
pursued seeking tax-exempt status for themselves as an educational group, 
member associations opposed this move as too disruptive to movement activities: 
it would prevent them from lobbying Congress for any specific legislation, and 
mandate that all educational activities be balanced pro and con. 
Instead, the FAS founded a new organization in December 1946, the 
Association of Scientists for Atomic Education (ASAE). Like the NCAI, this group 
had education, not activism, as its primary purpose, and so was able to receive 
tax-deductible donations and ECAS funds. Launched with $13,600 from the 
ECAS, the ASAE was composed of seven study committees covering international 
control, domestic developments, preventative war, secrecy and security in 
science, educational policy, educational techniques and their effectiveness, and 
foreign correspondence. This group had a brisk start, cooperating with the NCAl 
on community programs and sponsoring teacher education in New York state. 95 
In spite of this brief revival, however, trouble was brewing in every branch 
95 Smith,494-497. 
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of the movement. Ideological divides proliferated as it became increasingly 
unclear what path of action would allow the groups to fulfill their original goals, 
particularly with regard to international control of atomic energy. Some 
individuals were becoming increasingly convinced that a push for full world 
government was the only plausible solution. Others encouraged patience and 
faith in the U.N., while still others, including Urey, began contemplating a 
"limited world government"-- an alliance of"all nations willing to sacrifice 
sovereignty in the interests of self-defense against totalitarianism."96 Scientists 
not affiliated with the movement began to make public other views: Edward 
Teller offered a "Challenge to Atomic Scientists" in which he declared that if 
international control were unattainable, it was the responsibility of atomic 
scientists to keep the country prepared for war as well as peace. 
These divisions led to the Emergency Committee ofAtomic Scientists to 
cease its fund-raising campaign in June 1948. In a May memo to Dr. Harry 
Brown, the group's Executive Vice Chairman Harold Oram noted that although 
the group had the financial support of at least 15,000 Americans, "During the 
past year, there has developed a lack ofagreement within the Committee on 
positions to be taken to advance its stated purposes," as was apparent by the lack 
of a public position at the time: the closest to a consensus was an April 12th 
statement pushing for more education and continued faith in the United Nations 
which bore signatures from only eight of the twelve committee members. "This 
sadly curtails the possibility of effective fund raising which, in this field, is purely 
96 Smith, 504. 
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the presentation of an important point ofview on which the appeal and support 
are based."97 As was clear at the ECAS' outset, a compelling purpose and clear 
plan of action was all that was needed to raise funds and popillar support. 
Lacking either, Gram felt that it was at best immoral, and at worst ineffective, to 
pursue fund raising at this time. 
The Emergency Committee's decision to go dormant had repercussions 
throughout the movement. Although the NCAl chairman Ralph McDonald tried 
to rationalize the loss of the prominent scientist fund-raisers as signifying a new 
phase in the organization, leading them to look to social scientists and politicians 
for support, ultimately the lack of ECAS funding was a crippling blow. Likewise, 
when ECAS funds dried up the short-lived ASAE was also disbanded. The final 
ECAS fund drive in the spring of 1948 provided for financial commitments to the 
Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists although it left the group in a slight deficit. 
Supporters were notified of the group's dormancy and encouraged to support the 
Bulletin instead. The Emergency Committee legally dissolved in September 1951. 
LoYALTY, SECURITY, AND ANTICOMMUNISM: DANIEL MELCHER 
Financial troubles and uncertainty regarding the next logical path that its 
activism should take were certainly two sources of trouble that plagued the 
atomic scientists' movement from 1946 forward. Another persistent source of 
debate was over issues of communists within the movement, and later, difficulties 
for movement members seeking security clearances for government work. The 
97	 Memorandum: Harold L. Oram to Dr. Harry Brown, May 19 1948, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling 
Papers, Peace Collection, 13.5.25, Valley Library, Corvallis, Oregon. 
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growing body of work studying recently declassified FBI records shows that the 
suspicion, distrust, and persecution movement scientists faced was far from 
random, and that it had sources both outside and inside the organization. 
In Chapter 1, treatment of the McMahon act mentions that following the 
Canadian spy scare, accusations of anti-American or disloyal sentiment among 
scientists were used by opponents of the bill in order to urge continued military 
control. As explained there, Representative J. Parnell Thomas attempted to kill 
the bill while it was before the House Rules committee by citing accusations from 
a HUAC investigation regarding "subversive activities" at Oak Ridge. These 
activities, of course, were those of the atomic scientists' movement: Thomas 
pointed out that they were "devoted to the creation of some form ofworld 
government," "very active in support of international civilian control of the 
manufacture of atomic materials," and "definitely opposed to Army supervision at 
Oak Ridge." Furthermore, these subversive scientists "not only admit 
communications with persons outside of the United States but in substance say 
they intend to continue this practice."9B 
In addition to these true comments, phrased here to sound threatening, 
the preliminary HUAC report written by HUAC chief council Ernie Adamson also 
made a number of false statements. It claimed that the CIO was actively trying to 
unionize all Oak Ridge workers and that Oak Ridge security officers believed that 
"the peace and security of the United States is definitely in danger." Thomas' 
tirades on these subjects did not manage to delay the bill in the Rules Committee, 
98	 Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age ofAnxiety, (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 
1999)45-46. 
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and so he made his case again on the House floor, this time reading the entire 
Adamson report into the record in spite of direct refutation by Illinois democrat 
Adolph J. Sabath. Although the McMahon bill ultimately weathered these 
challenges and passed both House and Senate, the lesson was a hard one for the 
movement. These attacks and a broader realization of the organization's 
vulnerability to anti-Communist ideologues panicked FAS chair William 
Higginbotham. He issued a memo on July 18 discussing these fears with the FAS 
administrative committee, worrying over FBI surveillance and the potential 
destruction of the FAS and NCAl. Higginbotham began rigorously self-policing, 
making sure to distinguish his views from those of potentially subversive groups 
whose meetings he addressed and closely scrutinizing movement scientists for 
any sign of the ever-looming communist party line.99 
Science historian Jessica Wang's work with declassified FBI documents 
makes clear that individuals, from scientists to cab drivers, were informing on the 
activities of the atomic scientists' movement. It is also clear that in the summer 
of 1946, amidst internal concerns over the loyalty of NCAl chairman Daniel 
Melcher, two individuals from the FAS whom Wang assumes to have been 
Higginbotham and Joseph Rush, spoke with Attorney General Tom Clark. An 
informer's report described the July 26 meeting: 
"[Name deleted] reported to the Attorney General that 
he was fearful that the communists were obtaining 
positions in his organization for the purpose of taking 
over. Mr. Clark is reported to have stated if [name(s) 
deleted] would give him the names of the suspects he 
99 Wang, 50. 
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could have them checked and turn the information 
over to the Federation ofAmerican Scientists for 
their confidential use.100 
Melcher was fired two days later, although it seems that the FAS never took the 
Attorney General up on his offer for information. Instead, its leaders fired 
Melcher of their own accord, publicly because they "intended to expand and 
needed a man of higher qualifications and a bigger name to head the 
organization," but clearly over loyalty concerns. 
Melcher had been aware that some in the FAS were suspicious of his 
writings, which they accused him of being in accordance with the "party line." He 
wrote a letter ofprotest to the NCAl executive committee in early July 
complaining that he was the victim of red-baiting. When he was fired, thirteen of 
the fourteen NCAl staff members resigned. lOl 
A further repercussion of this internal purge was E.D. Condon's August 5 
resignation from the Emergency Committee. While his initial letter of 
resignation was quite brief and did not mention Melcher's dismissal, when asked 
to reconsider by Einstein he clarified his position: "In insisting on this decision I 
owe the others some words of explanation. I do not want to take the position of 
approving or disapproving the action of the National Committee on Atomic 
Information Executive Committee in dismissing Mr. Daniel Melcher."lo2 Condon 
was very careful not to state that he was resigning in protest of Melcher's 
100 Wang, 70, Wang's italics, not in original. 
101 Wang, 50. 
102 E.D. Condon to Albert Einstein, August 5, 1946, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling Papers, Peace 
Collection, 13.5.9, Valley Library, Corvallis, Oregon, and E.D. Condon to Albert Einstein, August 9, 
1946, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling Papers, Peace Collection, 13.5.9b, Valley Library, Corvallis, 
Oregon. 
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dismissal, although the tone and timing of his letter make clear that it was in 
response to the firing. He made explicit that he "would like to withdraw in a 
completely neutral spirit, without any implication of criticism or disapproval of 
the activities." Ironically, although here he was quite circumspect in not coming 
to Melcher's defense, Condon himselfwould soon become the center of a 
clearance controversy. 
In Melcher's case we see the consequences of oppression from the outside 
becoming oppression from within. Because he feared drawing punishment from 
the growing anti-Communist faction in government, Higginbotham was careful to 
purge from movement organizations individuals who might draw such criticism. 
This decision was only the beginning of a larger withdrawal from political action, 
however: while internal policing began by punishing those who held the wrong 
political ideology, it would eventually extend to those who made public any 
political views at all. When this shift occurred, the movement had fully 
capitulated to the re-assertion of the modern constitution. 
LoYALTY, SECURITY, AND ANTICOMMUNISM: EDWARD CONDON 
The Condon case was probably second in publicity only to the 
Oppenheimer security hearings. Condon, appointed to head the National Bureau 
ofStandards in November 1945, had drawn the suspicion of Representative J. 
Parnell Thomas during the McMahon hearings. Thomas became chair of the 
HUAC in late 1946, when the Republicans gained control of the House. In March 
1947, Thomas instigated two stories in the Washington Times-Herald about 
.l 
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Condon, once claiming that he had been duped into sponsoring a dinner for an 
alleged communist front group, and another stating that his loyalty was being 
probed over his membership in the American-Soviet Science Society. Attacks 
continued through June and July; on July 22nd Representative Chet Holifield 
defended Condon on the House floor. 
On 1 March 1948, Thomas' intentions became clear. He released a 
preliminary report from a HUAC subcommittee declaring that Condon was "one 
ofthe weakest links in our atomic security."103 The report rested entirely on 
innuendo, stating that Condon's security clearance with the AEC was pending 
(due not to unclear loyalty status but rather a bureaucratic backlog) and that he 
had associated with "an individual alleged, by a self-confessed Soviet espionage 
agent, to have engaged in espionage activities," (although there was no evidence 
linking Condon to those activities). In all, Thomas' objections were not to 
Condon's actions but to his political views.104 
Scientists' organizations, including the FAS, ECAS, Association of 
Pittsburgh Scientists, the Physical Society of Pittsburgh, the Physics Department 
faculty from Harvard, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
and the American Physical Society all came to Condon's public defense. The 
ECAS held a dinner for him in New York City on April 12, inviting "all those to 
103	 Wang, 132. 
104	 This material is well covered in Wang's section on "HUAC and the Condon Case, 1947-1948", pages 
130-147. However, while Wang notes that Thomas was "particularly suspicious of scientists," (136) the 
evidence she uses to support this claim implies only a distaste for politically active scientists. She 
quotes an article by Thomas in Liberty: "Our scientists, it seems, are well schooled in their specialties 
but not in the history of Communist tactics and designs. They have a weakness for attending meetings, 
signing petitions, sponsoring committees, and joining organizations labeled 'liberal' or 'progressive' but 
which are actually often Communist fronts." Clearly, those scientists not inclined to join political 
movements (especially liberal political movements) were not nearly as deserving of Thomas' ire. 
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whom the rights of the citizen to freedom of speech and freedom of research are 
ofvital importance, and who believe that both the liberty of the individual and 
the free progress of science are seriously threatened by the methods of the House 
Committee."los The dinner was a smashing success. Urey and Condon both spoke 
at length about the importance of freedom in science and society, and a great 
many donations to the Bulletin were sent in Condon's honor by individuals not 
able to attend. 
Condon was granted his AEC clearance on July 15, permitting him to 
access classified information as related to his duties as National Bureau of 
Standards director. The HUAC said nothing; the Bulletin complained: "This 
House Committee has the practice of never stating clearly that a man they have 
'investigated' has proved his innocence; but drops the investigation if it becomes 
'unprofitable,' leaving lingering suspicions."lo6 Indeed, Condon's career was 
plagued by lingering suspicions, eventually driving him from government into 
industry, and then, when his industry work also required a clearance, into 
academia. 
Though Condon's case was sensational, it was not representative of most 
scientists' run-ins with the uncertain clearance procedures. Most scientists were 
less well-known than Condon, with fewer high-level friends and less familiarity 
with government procedures. Examples range from John and Hildred Blewett, 
married physicists who were kept in limbo for seven months waiting to begin 
lOS Urey to "Friend," Aprill, 1948, Eva Marie and Linus Pauling Papers, Peace Collection, 13.4.20, Valley 
Library, Corvallis, Oregon. 
106 Quoted in Wang, 145. 
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r 
work at Brookhaven only to be denied clearance, but permitted to work on 
unclassified projects, to J.W. Mauchley, who's clearance was revoked in January 
1950 because "someone claimed to have seen his name on a petition circulated by 
the Association of Philadelphia scientists calling for civilian control of atomic 
energy."107 These individuals were caught up in the system with no defenders and 
were not sufficiently savvy to protect themselves. 
The cases of Condon, Mauchley, the Blewetts, and the thousands of other 
scientific workers inconvenienced, attacked, or fired throughout these early Cold 
War years demonstrate the ways in which government power could be used to 
enforce particular political views among scientists. When many of the jobs in 
science were for the government, and most of these required security clearances 
which could be denied on any number of personal or political grounds, the FBI, 
HUAC, and AEC security review board wielded a surprising amount of power 
over the political actions of scientists. In these years the message was clear: 
scientists, unless explicitly employed in an advisory role, should stay away from 
politics altogether. Those who did not were quite literally putting their careers at 
risk. The modern constitution, with its strict divide between the social and the 
scientific, had found a strong enforcer in the anti-Communist forces of the early 
Cold War. 
LOYALlY, SECURIlY, AND ANTICOMMUNISM: J. EDGAR HOOVER VS. THE SENATE 
Each of the above cases deals with individuals and could therefore be 
107	 Wang, 100; Paul Fonnan, "Beyond Quantum Electrodynamics: National Security as Basis for Physical 
Research in the United States 1940-1960, (HSPS 18: 1)174. 
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dismissed or justified on an individual basis. The most amusing, and most 
telling, case from this period, involved a large group: "an enormous Soviet 
Espionage Ring" in Washington D.C. This ring, as was reported to FBI director J. 
Edgar Hoover by an informant, and was repeated by Hoover to presidential 
confidante George E. Allen as "of interest to the president," included individuals 
at the highest levels: Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of 
Commerce Henry A. Wallace, and E. U. Condon. It was allegedly lead by James 
R. Newman, council to the Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy. Hoover 
wrote: 
The informant has drawn the conclusion that the 
entire setup of the McMahon Committee to 
investigate and recommend legislation on atomic 
energy and its use is a scheme to make available 
information concerning the atomic bomb and atomic 
energy, and that it all amounts to Soviet espionage in 
this country directed toward the obtaining for the 
Soviet Union the knowledge possessed by the United 
States concerning atomic energy and specifically the 
atomic bomb. lOs 
To Hoover and his informant, the very proceedings ofthe Senate, the testimony 
of the scientists, and all surrounding activism, was inherently suspicious-- as the 
above report concludes, it was all probably Soviet espionage. 
John Earl Haynes' 1996 work, Red Scare or RedMenace: American 
Communism andAnticommunism in the Cold War Era, provides substantial 
evidence that the Soviets were quite interested in American scientific 
information, and were actively pursuing it through agents in this country. What 
108 Wang, 78. 
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needs to be explained, though, is the suspicion of the atomic scientists' 
movement: there is no obvious link between atomic espionage and all activist 
scientists. We can find this link firmly in the modern constitution. The 
perspectives of Representative J. Parnell Thomas and J. Edgar Hoover depend on 
a static world order, and everything in its place, a worldview that corresponds 
strikingly with the modem constitution. Scientists who traversed the ground 
between the social and natural spheres were considered threatening. Activist 
scientists were clearly out of place and therefore worthy of suspicion. It follows 
from this that we see the place of scientists actively debated within the movement 
during these tumultuous years as in the instances that follow. 
A QUESTION OF PLACE: DETERMINING LEGmMATE SCIENTIFIC SPEECH 
In May of 1947, Oppenheimer wrote William Higginbotham a letter 
declaring that the federation could only be useful if the scientists change their 
role: 
no longer that of the prophets ofdoom coming out of 
the desert, but rather that of a group of specialized 
and, in their way, competent men who must be 
sensitive to all new avenues of approach which are 
hopeful and who are after all intellectuals and not 
politicians. If you can help to achieve this, you will 
have not only my support but my warm and I hope, 
useful assistance.109 
In this letter, Oppenheimer takes a similar tone to his entreaties to the 
Association of Los Alamos scientists at the very outset of the movement: asking 
109 Quoted in Smith, 503, italics mine. 
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group members to temper the approach, recognize the limitations on the validity 
of their opinions, and elect to serve as specialized advisers, competent, at best, "in 
their way," but not generally so. By choosing this role, as Oppenheimer had 
advocated all along, the movement would win his support. 
This view did not come only from the outside players such as 
Oppenheimer, however. Beginning in the spring of 1948, internal memos suggest 
a similar self-censorship within the Association of Scientists for Atomic 
Education. A May 10 memo from four members of the Atlantic Region of the 
ASAE recommended that "the Regional Council, at its meeting on May 23, adopt 
a policy dividing public statements by ASAE officials or Committees into three 
classes:" Scientific Facts, Facts or policies on which there is discussion and 
disagreement, and individual opinions. Furthermore, all statements falling into 
the latter two categories must be clearly labeled as such and explicitly dissociated 
from the organization. This memo was similar in tone to criticism made against 
the scientists at the very outset of their activities, such as when the New York 
Times declared in October 1945 "On issues of foreign policy... the atomic scientist 
carried no more authority than an 'intelligent doctor or carpenter."'110 The 
striking difference here, though, is that the criticism is now being applied from 
the inside. The modern constitution had crept back in to the mindset of the 
movement. 
110 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn ofthe Atomic Age 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994),94. 
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MOTHER MAy I?: THE MODERN CoNSTmmON RETURNS 
Concluding her treatment of the movement's lost momentum only two 
years after its start, Alice Kimball Smith describes an almost inevitable 
progression: combining hopelessness in the face of the United Nations stalemate 
and a general realization that the cold war world wasn't so bad, scientists went 
back to its laboratories, leaving politics behind them. Furthermore, "the rapid 
incorporation of scientists into government in an advisory role meant that they 
themselves were to a large extent able to call the tune."111 Introducing an 
understanding of anti-communism from within and without the organization 
complicates this matter, however, and shifting views of science in society muddy 
the waters more. 
In a memorable passage describing the "invincibility of the moderns," 
Bruno Latour writes: 
Because it believes in the total separation of humans 
and nonhumans, and because it simultaneously 
cancels out this separation, the Constitution has made 
the moderns invincible.... Ifyou object that they are 
being duplicitous, they will show you that they never 
confuse the Laws ofNature with imprescriptible 
human freedom. Ifyou believe them and direct your 
attention elsewhere, they will take advantage of this to 
transfer thousands of objects from Nature into the 
social body while procuring for this body the solidity 
of natural things. Ifyou turn round suddenly, as in 
the children's game 'Mother, may IT, they will freeze, 
looking innocent, as if they hadn't budged: here, on 
the left, are things themselves; there, on the right, is 
the free society of speaking, thinking subjects, values, 
and signs.112 
III Smith,522. 
112 Latour, 37. 
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This game of "Mother, may I?" was going on within government ranks in the final 
years of the 1940S. On the one hand, the FBI, the HUAC, and eventually 
President Truman as well all proclaimed that movement scientists were 
improper, and that the speech of scientists is unwelcome outside of its prescribed 
boundaries. On the other, the President and other governmental institutions 
were scuttling across the line scientists, mostly those not tainted by political 
activism, and installing them in official positions. These scientists in government 
were called science advisers and their political role was viewed as entirely proper. 
When we turn as if to catch them, we are shown that everything is indeed as it 
should be: scientists are in their laboratories, advisers are in Washington, and no 
one is speaking out-of-bounds- a neat trick. 
In part because of pressures from without and in part because of divisions 
within, the atomic scientists' movement pulled away from its bold 
demonstrations asserting the changed role of science in society. They returned, 
for the most part, to a traditional "modern" position, engaged in the study of 
Nature and thus unqualified to speak about Society with any special knowledge. 
For a time, the conventionality of McCarthyism and the Cold War kept the 
modern constitution in fine form. The fissure created by the atomic bomb did not 
disappear, however. Only some twelve years later, when individuals like Thomas 
Kuhn, Bruno Latour, and Michel CalIon began questioning the role of science in 
society, they struggled with some of the very same points that Niels Bohr and 
James Franck struggled with in 1944. These scholars wondered ifperhaps 
science could not be isolated quite so neatly from society. Perhaps an 
l.. 
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understanding of society was needed to truly understand science, and maybe a 
better understanding of science would help students of society. Then again, 
perhaps the notion of these as separate things is not so helpful after all. In a 
world where the modern constitution is breaking apart, just how it ought to be re­
ordered remains unclear. However, the now-widespread disciplines of history 
and sociology of science, "science studies", or "science, technology, and society" 
make clear that the modern constitution, defended so rigorously through the 
1950s, may be gone for good. 
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Atomic and World Events, 1942-1948: 
A Timeline 
I Atomic Scientists' Movement I WWIJ and Cold War Events 
Arthur Compton forms the Metallurgical January 1942 
Laboratory at the University of Chicago 
with the objective of producing 
plutonium in an atomic pile. 
FDR instructs OSRD Director Vannevar June 1942 Battle ofMidway halts Japanese 
Bush to promote a full-scale effort to expansion to the east. 
build the bomb: he forms the Manhattan 
District of the Army Engmeers. r 
Laboratory: soon has a staffofmore than 
2,000 people. 
At the Metallurgical Laboratory, several 
meetings are held to express concern over 
the future of nuclear policy: attempts at 
organization disbanded by military 
officials. 
Niels Bohr meets with President 
Roosevelt to encourage him to 
communicate with Russia regarding the 
atomic bomb. i 
! 
i 
rrhe Franck Report, a document from the 
I Metallurgical Laboratory expressing 
concern over use of atomic weapons and 
a post-war arms race, is sent to the 
Secretary of War. 
In Alamogordo, New Mexico, the fIrst 
I -.. .. 
Creation of Los Alamos Weapons r March 1943 
I 
I 
July-August I1943 I 
I 
July 1944 I 
May 1945
 
June 1945
 
July 1945
 
Germany surrenders unconditionally in 
Rheims, France. 
The U.N. Charter is signed in San 
Francisco. 
Potsdam Conference in Potsdam, 
Germany, calls for unconditional 
surrender from Ja.p 
Leo Szil",d s,"ds sevenlilett..-s of I 
protest to President Truman. 
August 1945 IA uranium bomb, dubbed Little Boy, is II! 
dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. Three 
I 
days later, a plutonium bomb, Fat Man, I 
is dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. 
A uranium bomb, dubbed Little Boy, is 
~ ropped on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later, a plutonium bomb, Fat Man, is dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. 
I 
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The May-Johnson bill, a War Department I 
plan for domestic control of atomic I 
October 1945 
energy, is introduced into Congress with 
the endorsements ofBush, Conant, 
Lawrence, Fermi, Compton, and 
Oppenheimer. i 
The Federation ofAtomic Scientists, 
, under the leadership of William 
IHigginbotham, forms in Washington D.C. 
largely to oppose the May-Johnson Bill. 
The McMahon bill is introduced into 
Congress as an alternative to the May­
Johnson plan for domestic control of 
atomic energy. 
President Truman expresses support for 
the McMahon bill. 
November 1945 
December 1945 
February 1946 
--I 
i 
I 
reView program requmng loyalty tests 
I for federal employees. 
Nuclear testing begins at Bikini. 
The scientists' movement book, One 
World or None, is published. 
March 1946 IThe Canadian government announces 
that several scientists have been found 
involved in espionage. 
Winston Churchill delivers the "Iron 
Curtain" speech at Westminster College 
in FUlton, Missouri, describing the 
I growing rift between Soviet and Western 
powers. 
June 1946 
The HUAC investigates Oak Ridge I April 1946 
scientists on suspicion of espionage, but I 
fmds nothing. J 
! I 
I Bernard Baruch presents a plan for 
I 
international control of nuclear energy to 
the United Nations. 
McMahon bill is signed into law. I August 1946 
~October 1946 David Lilienthal is appointed to head the 
newly-formed Atomic Energy 
Commission. 
II I March 1947 I~e~ident Truman esUlblishes a loyalty-
I I U.S. begins active fmancial support of 
I government forces in the Greek Civil 
! War. 
I 
June 1947 IMarshall Plan is announced. 
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HUAC chair Parnell Thomas declares 
that Edward Condon' was "one of the 
weakest links in our atomic security." 
Condon is investigated and accused of 
espionage, though the claims are never 
March 1948 
substantiated. I 
Formal deadlock declared at United I 
Nations, the Baruch Plan for international 
control is abandoned. 
The Emergency Committee of Atomic : 
Scientists concludes fund-raising 
activities and declares itself"dormant." 
June 1948 Due to a Soviet blockade, for the next 
320 days the Western sections of Berlin 
are denied power and supplies, relying 
on British and U.S. airlifts to survive. 
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